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Using a panel of Chinese listed ﬁrms over the period 1998–2015, we examine the extent to which
liquidity impacts ﬁrms' acquisition decisions, method of payment choice, and performance fol-
lowingmergers.We observe that cash-rich ﬁrms aremore likely to attempt acquisitions, especial-
ly if they are subject to tunneling. Next, we ﬁnd that bidders with higher growth opportunities are
less likely to use cash payments in acquisitions. This effect is stronger for ﬁnancially constrained
bidders, who face greater opportunity costs of holding cash. Our last set of results highlights the
under-performance of cash acquisitions in both the short and long term.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
China's Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) transactions, including domestic consolidation, as well as outward and inward takeovers,
have signiﬁcantly increased in recent years (see Table 1). According to Bloomberg's 2012M&A outlook, China engaged in 158 billion
US dollars' worth of takeover deals in 2011. This represents a 9% increase from the 145 billion US dollars announced in 2010.
Several explanations have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. First, the gradual establishment and development of China's
capital markets and the impact of globalization have played a signiﬁcant role. Speciﬁcally, China's accession to theWorld Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) in 2001 encouraged Chinese enterprises to restructure and consolidate throughM&As, in order to defend themselves from
the inﬂuxof strong foreign competitors and/or to expand their business territories overseas. Second, given the high growth rates and large
amounts of proﬁts generated by Chinese ﬁrms, strategicmergers, including inward and outwardM&A investments, have offered Chinese
ﬁrms opportunities to seek further economies of scale or other synergies, enhancing their competitive advantage. Third, M&As have be-
come easier in the light of the relaxation of obstacles to their approval process, and of the constantly evolving regulatory and taxation
framework surrounding them. Fourth, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been restructuring their assets through M&As. In
particular, SOEs operating in strategically relevant sectors such as basic materials, energy, utilities, telecommunications, aerospace, and
defense have been encouraged to form global conglomerates. At the same time, other SOEs have been required to reduce their equity
to generate efﬁciency improvements and increase competitiveness. This has offered opportunities of market entry for other potential in-
vestors (Devonshire-Ellis et al., 2011). However, could other factors also contribute to explaining the surge in Chinese M&As?
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Cash is an important source of ﬁnance for ﬁrms operating in imperfect capital markets. In a recent study, Guariglia et al. (2011)
highlight the relatively highﬁnancial capacitywhich characterizes Chinese ﬁrms due to their high growth rates and ability to generate
large amounts of internal funds. Along similar lines, Guariglia and Yang (2016a) document that, in their sample of Chinese listedﬁrms
covering the period 1998–2010, themedian level of cash holdings to total assets is 12.1%, much higher than the overall median (6.2%)
of the 45 countries analyzed by Dittmar et al. (2003). In addition, the average level of cash holdings in China almost doubled over their
sample period. An interesting question is therefore whether these high and growing levels of corporate liquidity are linked to the
surge in Chinese M&As. This paper seeks to investigate this issue.
Theories that focus on corporate liquidity and the costs of cash holdings can help to understand what drives acquisitions. From a
micro perspective, the existence of capital market imperfections (CMI) contributes to ﬁnancial frictions, as a consequence of which
ﬁrms face a cost premium on external ﬁnance. Under these circumstances, it is suggested that ﬁrms prefer to use internal ﬁnance
like cash or retained earnings rather than external ﬁnance such as bank loans, debt, and equity (Myers, 1984). In particular, compared
to their ﬁnancially healthy counterparts, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms value their cash holdings more since liquidity allows them to
investwithout having to access new costly debt or equity (Faulkender andWang, 2006). Thus, corporate liquidity should play a crucial
role in investment decisions, including acquisitions. In particular, liquidity may enable ﬁrms to undertake acquisitions, as it can be
used directly as a measure of payment or can be used tomeet interest payments on debt ﬁnance. It follows that an increase in corpo-
rate liquidity should enhance ﬁrms' acquisition activities. In line with this argument, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) note that high cor-
porate liquidity has driven world merger waves in the last century.1 More recently, focusing on data from 36 countries, Erel et al.
(2017) ﬁnd that higher cash holdings increase the probability a ﬁrm will undertake an acquisition.
Furthermore, consistent with the agency costs theory, the free cash ﬂow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) may also explain why ﬁrms
with high liquidity aremore likely to engage in takeovers: A high liquidity offers in factmanagers the incentive tomake self-interested
and entrenched decisions on low-beneﬁt projects or acquisitions. Hanson (1992) ﬁnds evidence that acquiring ﬁrms with large free
cash ﬂow tend to undertake low-beneﬁt acquisitions. Harford (1999) alsoﬁnds a positive relation between cash-richness and the like-
lihood of a bid, whichhe attributes to the presence of agency conﬂicts betweenmanagement and shareholders. In linewith the agency
costs of free cashﬂow explanation for acquisitions, a negativemarket reaction for acquiringﬁrmswith excess cash has been observed,
due to the expectation of poor future performance. For instance, Oler (2008) ﬁnds that the level of cash ﬂow of acquirer ﬁrms is sig-
niﬁcantly negatively related to their performance in terms of post-acquisition returns on net operating assets.2
Despite the numerous studies that rationalize the liquidity reason of the occurrence ofmergers and acquisitions, only a few papers
have paid attention to the motives behind China's takeovers (Chi et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2015; Black et al., 2015). To the best of our
1 Along similar lines, according to the neoclassical hypothesis, industry assets can be restructured via mergers, in response to technological, regulatory, or supply
shocks, provided that sufﬁcient capital liquidity is available. Harford (2005) argues that economic motivation and high macro-level capital liquidity have generated a
large number of merger deals over time. Similarly, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) observe that procyclical capital liquidity goes hand in hand with capital reallocation
among ﬁrms, suggesting that liquidity is a critical factor for industry shocks to generate merger waves.
2 Similarly, using a sample of pure stock acquisitions, Gao (2011) observes lower announcement returns for acquiring ﬁrms with excess cash, and explains this ﬁnd-
ing not in the light of agency costs, but of adverse selection costs associatedwith corporate cash holdings in the presence of asymmetric information. Yet, it should also
be noted thatM&As represent a quick way to spend excess cash, which may limit the discretion of management and relieve the agency problems of free cash ﬂow. Ac-
cording to Myers and Majluf (1984) and Smith and Kim (1994), mergers can in fact create value by reducing resource misallocations (e.g. combining the resources of
cash-surplus ﬁrms with ﬁrms without sufﬁcient ﬁnancial slack).
Table 1
Distribution of the number of M&A deals in China by year.
Year Non-Bidders Bidders Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only Completed Total No. Bidder Perc.
1998 709 15 0 1 14 9 724 2.07%
1999 789 21 0 0 21 8 810 2.59%
2000 913 20 0 0 20 7 933 2.14%
2001 984 21 0 1 20 8 1005 2.09%
2002 979 88 2 6 80 40 1067 8.25%
2003 939 184 1 17 166 75 1123 16.38%
2004 948 265 2 24 239 79 1213 21.85%
2005 1045 172 0 9 163 51 1217 14.13%
2006 1083 182 11 17 154 57 1265 14.39%
2007 1094 266 31 14 221 83 1360 19.56%
2008 1072 349 63 9 277 124 1421 24.56%
2009 1180 298 48 17 233 97 1478 20.16%
2010 1374 325 39 23 263 109 1699 19.13%
2011 1505 341 28 14 299 117 1846 18.47%
2012 1606 318 30 14 274 115 1924 16.53%
2013 1611 327 56 11 260 148 1938 16.87%
2014 1567 368 82 11 275 162 1935 19.02%
2015 1494 436 115 15 306 190 1930 22.59%
Total 20,892 3996 508 203 3285 1479 24,888 16.06%
Notes: this table reports the time-series distribution of the number of observations. Bidders represent the ﬁrms who announced a bid in a given year. Non-Bidders rep-
resent theﬁrmswhodid not announce a bid in a given year. Stock Only includes deals thatwereﬁnanced only by stock. Cash Only includes deals that were ﬁnanced only
by cash.Mixed PYMT consists of those deals whose paymentswere not solely completed through stock or cash. Completed represents the deals whose transactionswere
completed. Total No. represents the total number of observations in a given year.
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knowledge, none of these studies has analyzed the role of corporate liquidity. Given the substantial increase in M&As characterizing
the country, the Chinese case represents an ideal laboratory to further our understanding of themotives behind acquisitions and other
aspects of merger policies.
Our work contributes to existing literature in the following two ways. First, it analyzes for the ﬁrst time, the interactions between
corporate liquidity and M&As in the Chinese context. Considering the very high levels of cash holdings characterizing Chinese ﬁrms,
this represents an interesting research question. In particular, we investigate the extent towhich takeovers in China are driven by free
cash ﬂow and/or expropriation motives. This will enable us to assess whether it is agency costs between managers and owners that
can explain mergers, as proposed in Western countries (Jensen, 1986; Hanson, 1992; Smith and Kim, 1994; Harford, 1999; Oler,
2008); or if, instead, in emerging economies such as China, where weak corporate governance coexists with high ownership concen-
tration, it is the agency conﬂict between majority and minority shareholders, which is responsible for M&As. Second, we investigate
the extent to which opportunity costs of holding cash and ﬁnancing constraints can explain the novel ﬁnding that cash bidders in the
Chinese context perform worse than stock bidders, which goes in sharp contrast to the existing evidence from Western countries.
Third, our paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of acquiring ﬁrms' short- and long-term performance in relation to different
methods of payment.
Overall, our study, which is based on a panel of 2013 listed ﬁrms over the period 1998–2015, provides a portrait of the nature and
implications of M&As in China, and sheds light on how liquidity affects ﬁrms' acquisition decisions, method of payment choices, and
post-merger performance.We provide support for the agency costs of free cash ﬂowhypothesis, according towhich cash-rich Chinese
ﬁrms tend to make use of their excess cash to take over other ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that the role of cash manifests itself more for ﬁrms
with a greater likelihood of tunneling, which provides further support to the agency costs of free cash ﬂowhypothesis. Next, given the
impact of the opportunity cost of holding cash, we ﬁnd that, especially for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, greater growth prospects,
reﬂected by a higher Tobin's Q, reduce bidders' willingness to use cash payments in acquisitions. Our results also indicate that cash
acquisitions underperform stock ones: Abnormal announcement returns are found to be worse for cash bidders. This is consistent
with the explanation that given their lower opportunity cost of holding cash, ﬁnancially rich ﬁrms with few growth prospects are
more likely to use excess cash as payment to undertake value-destroying M&A deals. Taking a longer-term perspective, we also ob-
serve a decrease in average bidders' performance one to two years after acquisitions ﬁnanced in cash, which once again supports
the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis as an explanation for acquisitions by ﬁrms with excess cash.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a reviewof related research anddevelops our hypotheses. In
Section 3, we describe themain features of our data and present summary statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis. Section
5 concludes.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development
2.1. Tunneling motive of acquisitions in China
In the presence of information asymmetries, liquid assets can protect ﬁrms from the costs associated with capital market imper-
fections. According to Keynes (1936), holding a sufﬁcient amount of liquid assets enables ﬁrms to undertake valuable projects once
the opportunity arises. However, liquiditymay also givemanagementﬂexibility to pursue its ownobjectives, whichmay be detrimen-
tal to theﬁrm. The free cash ﬂowhypothesis advanced by Jensen (1986) suggests thatmanagers endowedwith free cashﬂoware like-
ly to expand their ﬁrms beyond the optimal size or undertake unproﬁtable projects. Given the fact that excess cash can be seen as
hoarded free cash ﬂow, excess cash reserves can lead to agency conﬂicts over the disposal of cash. In the light of these considerations,
it should be noted that M&As represent a quick way to spend cash instead of paying it out to shareholders. Thus, when a ﬁrm accu-
mulates more than its normal level of cash, it is more likely to engage in takeovers (Harford, 1999).
Yet, the divergence of interests betweenmajority shareholders andminority shareholdersmight play an evenmore important role
in explaining mergers and acquisitions, especially in an emergingmarket economy such as China. This is because, in China, tunneling
(which refers to the appropriation of a ﬁrm's assets and the expropriation of minority investors by controlling shareholders or man-
agers for personal gain) is widespread among listed ﬁrms. This is due to their unique concentrated ownership structure and the share
segmentation system,3 as well as to the weak corporate governance mechanisms and public enforcement (Liu and Lu, 2007; Jiang et
al., 2010; Peng et al., 2011; Bhaumik and Selarka, 2012). Firms subject to tunneling might make strategically self-interested and
entrenched decisions such as M&As to divert resources away from disbursal among shareholders (Bhaumik and Selarka, 2012). In
other words, M&As or other related party transactions between Chinese listed ﬁrmsmay provide direct opportunities for controlling
shareholders, management and/or local governments to direct assets or proﬁts out of ﬁrms, helping them in this way achieve their
personal or political beneﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders.4
We suggest that an acquisition decision in China is unlikely to be motivated by purely economic considerations for the following
reasons. First, in China,most publicly listed companies are carve-outs or spin-offs from large state-owned enterprises, formed through
the divestment of less proﬁtable or unrelated subsidiary businesses. These listed ﬁrms are strongly dependent on their parent ﬁrms, as
3 Before the 2005 split share structure reform, which was gradually implemented by Chinese ﬁrms over the period 2005–2010, the shares of listed ﬁrms in China
could be either tradable or non-tradable (J. Chen et al., 2016; Cumming and Hou, 2014). After the implementation of the reform, all shares became tradable.
4 A related party transaction is deﬁned as any transaction such as asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity transfers, loan guarantees, accounts receivable, and so on, be-
tween listed subsidiaries and their afﬁliated parent companies (controlling shareholders). Related party transactions in the form of M&As are common in China (Chi et
al., 2011). These transactions give direct opportunities to controlling shareholders to extract cash from their related listedﬁrms through tunneling (Djankov et al., 2008).
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they typically share personnel, capital, and assets (Liu and Lu, 2007). As a result, the former often need to provide resources for their
inefﬁcient parents. In some cases, the listed ﬁrmsmay be asked to take over the poor-performing assets or shares of their parent ﬁrms
or controlling shareholders, or to purchase the assets or shares at a higher price (than the real value), particularly when these listed
ﬁrms experience high proﬁtability or hold excess cash in hand. A case study that illustrates this issue is presented in Appendix 1.
Second, in China, it is very common for acquirers and targets to have strong connections with or belong to the same local govern-
ment supervision. Local government-controlled shareholders have a strong incentive to intervene in corporate business activities, as
listed ﬁrms play a signiﬁcant role in the regional economic development and socialwelfare. Moreover, themanagement of listed SOEs
is often appointed by the government (their controlling shareholders). In order to support loss-making small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) achieve political objectives, avoid unemployment, andmaintain social stability, themanagement of these listedﬁrms
with high proﬁtability or excess liquidity may be required by the government to absorb the SMEs, and engage in administrative
restructuring plans to turn around their performance (Chi et al., 2011). Especially, when local governments face large ﬁscal deﬁcits,
or when unemployment is high, they may have higher incentives to interfere in the M&A deals of ﬁrms afﬁliated with them.
Third, controlling shareholders or local governors have a strongmotivation to build empires and/or to stimulate regional economic
growth through M&As, which may not maximize shareholders' wealth, but increase instead the resources and power in their hands
and give them the chance to stand out in the political competition for promotion (Liu and Lu, 2007; Guariglia and Yang, 2016b).
In summary, tunneling may be a strong motivation behind acquisition activities in China, as controlling shareholders (local gov-
ernments) and management may use M&As as opportunities to spend excess cash for their private beneﬁt instead of paying it out
to their shareholders. We, therefore, propose our ﬁrst hypothesis:
HΙ: In the Chinese context, cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to make acquisitions, especially if they are subject to tunneling.
2.2. Opportunity cost of holding cash
Substantial empirical evidence has documented a precautionary motive for cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007;
Bates et al., 2009). In the event of unexpected earnings shortfalls or costly external ﬁnance, ex-ante cash reserves prevent ﬁrms from
underinvesting ex-post. Especiallywhen high-Q “glamor” ﬁrms have difﬁculties in accessing external capital due to asymmetric infor-
mation problems, liquidity management can play an important role. In line with these arguments, Almeida et al. (2004) argue that
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms have a greater propensity to save cash out of cash ﬂow. Furthermore, Faulkender and Wang (2006)
ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher ﬁnancial constraints beneﬁt more from holding cash than their ﬁnancially healthier counterparts.
The level of ﬁnancial frictions has been found to have a large bearing on ﬁrms' investment decisions (Fazzari et al., 1988; Harford,
1999). As a particular type of investment, M&A activities should also be strongly inﬂuenced by these frictions. Acquiring ﬁrms face a
choice of payment between cash and stock. In line with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, Alshwer et al. (2011) show
thatﬁnancially constrainedUSbidderswithhigh growth opportunities (reﬂected by a highTobin'sQ) face a higher opportunity cost of
holding cash, and prefer therefore to save more cash to avoid the costs of forgoing positive net present value (NPV) projects in the
future. This suggests that opportunity costs of holding cash and ﬁnancing constraints can both explain the method of payment. Ex-
tending Alshwer et al.'s (2011) arguments to the Chinese case, we argue that in the presence of a higher Tobin's Q, ﬁnancially
constrained bidders would rather not spend cash on acquisitions since they face higher opportunity costs of holding cash. By contrast,
ﬁrms with easier access to ﬁnancial markets may not have such a strong preference for paymentmethods, since theymay easily fund
their current or future investments using debt or equity. In the light of these considerations, our secondhypothesis takes the following
form:
HΙΙ: In the Chinese context, acquirers' cash payment decisions are negatively related to growth opportunities (Tobin's Q). This association
is stronger for ﬁnancially constrained bidders compared to their ﬁnancially healthier counterparts.
Based on the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, we argue that, in the Chinese context, acquiring ﬁrms prefer to use cash
in acquisitionswhen they face a lower opportunity cost of holding cash, i.e. when investment opportunities are low. Thismay result in
cash being wasted on acquisitions, which may, in turn, result in underperformance of acquiring ﬁrms. This is in contrast to evidence
fromWestern countries, where cash acquisitions outperform stock acquisitions as the former signal positive information, while the
latter signal asymmetric information (Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Loughran and Anand, 1997; Andrade et al., 2001; Linn and
Switzer, 2001; Abhyankar et al., 2005). Our third hypothesis posits therefore that, in the Chinese context, contrary towhat is observed
in Western countries, cash payments have a negative effect on market reaction and post-merger operating performance. In other
words:
HΙII: In the Chinese context, acquirers who use cash to ﬁnance their acquisitions perform signiﬁcantly worse than acquirers who use
stock. Speciﬁcally, compared to stock bidders, cash bidders exhibit lower short-run abnormal returns. Additionally, cash bidders show de-
creasing operating performance from the pre- to the post-merger period.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. The dataset
To test our hypotheses, we construct a sample of ﬁrms that issued A-shares on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) during the period 1998–2015. The data is based on annual observations and taken from the China
Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and China Center for Economics Research (CCER) database. Following
the literature, we exclude ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial sector, due to their different measurement of liquidity, and their dissimilar
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operating, investing, and ﬁnancing activities.We further winsorize observations in the 1% tails of the regression variables tominimize
the potential inﬂuence of outliers. Finally, we drop all ﬁrmswith less than three years of consecutive observations, as ourmodels con-
tain leads and lags of relevant variables. All variables are deﬂated using the gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂator (National Bureau of
Statistics of China).
In addition, our sample includes all Chinese acquisitions announced between January 1st 1998 and December 31st 2015, taken
from the Thomson Financial SDC (Securities Data Corporation)Mergers and Acquisitions database. Acquiring ﬁrms are Chinese public
ﬁrms listed on either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Target ﬁrms are both publicly and privately held corporations,
located in China. Both successful and unsuccessful deals are taken into consideration.When the biddermakesmultiple acquisition at-
tempts during a year, we only consider the ﬁrst attempt during that year as we are unable to identify the others. The M&A sample is
matched with the accounting information from our main dataset.
Ourﬁnal unbalanced panel consists of 24,888ﬁrm-year observations representing 2013 listed ﬁrms. The number of years available
for each ﬁrmvaries between three and eighteen,while the number of ﬁrm-year observations varies fromaminimumof 724 in 1998 to
a maximum of 1938 in 2013. The sample includes 1152 unique acquirers making 3966 deals.5 Table 1 provides a breakdown of non-
bidders and bidders by year, differentiated bymethod of payment. We observe a clear increasing trend of the number of M&As in our
sample period. This could be explained by the signiﬁcant increase in the level of cash held by Chinese companies over the same period
(Guariglia andYang, 2016a). In addition, themajority of our acquiringﬁrms (82.2%) use cash as payment in acquisitions, whereas only
12.7% of bidders use pure stock.6
3.2. Summary statistics
Table 2 presents means and medians of key variables for the full sample, and provides a comparison of these same statistics for
bidders and non-bidders. We also conduct statistical tests for equality of the means (t-test) and sample medians (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test) of each variable across the two groups. All variables are deﬁned in Appendix 2. With regard to liquidity variables [Cash,
net working capital (NWC)], bidders show lower mean and median liquidity ratios (e.g. 0.154 and 0.128 for Cash) compared to
non-bidders (e.g. 0.175 and 0.137 for Cash). Moreover, bidders exhibit, on average, a slightly higher leverage (mean: 0.219; median:
0.21) than non-bidders (mean: 0.192; median: 0.173). P-values associated with tests for equality of both sample means (t-test) and
samplemedians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) show that, in both cases, the differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The higher leverage
and lower liquidity shown by bidders might be due to the fact that they need to increase leverage and spend liquidity to engage in
acquisitions. In unreported results, we also ﬁnd that the liquidity of bidding ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher than that of non-bidders in
the year prior to acquisitions. This conﬁrms that bidders spend a large amount of cash in acquisitions.
We also observe that acquiring ﬁrms are larger than their non-acquiring counterparts, regardless of whether size is measured in
terms of assets or number of employees, and show better performance than non-bidders in terms of sales growth and stock returns
(Return). Once again, p-values associated with tests for equality of both sample means (t-test), and sample medians (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test) show that the differences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In order to measure incentives for tunneling, following Jiang et al. (2010), we use the ratio of other receivables to total assets
(OREC),7 and the separation of the blockholder's controlling right and her/his ownership right (DIF_Blockholders).8 We observe that
42.3% of the bidders in our sample exhibit a divergence between the blockholder's controlling ownership and cash ﬂow ownership
(DIF_Blockhoders), which is signiﬁcantly larger than the corresponding value observed for non-bidders (31.8%). However, bidders
do not display a higher ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC) compared to non-bidders (the corresponding ratios for the
two groups of ﬁrms are 0.032 and 0.041, respectively). This suggests that acquisitions are not solely fueled by tunneling.
Table 2 also shows that bidders are more likely to pay dividends (Payout). This suggests that they might distribute cash via divi-
dends to reduce the agency costs of free cash ﬂow. Finally, CEOs in bidder companies are less likely to hold shares in their own com-
pany compared to non-bidders. Given thatmanagerial ownership (Shareholding_CEO) aligns themanagers' interests with those of the
ﬁrm's shareholders, ﬁrmswith higher managerial ownership are in fact less likely to make entrenched decisions on value-decreasing
acquisitions.
5 See Table 1 for more details about the structure of our sample. Given the unbalanced nature of our panel, which allows for both entry and exit, potential selection
and survivor bias are eased.
6 The split share structure of China's stockmarkets led to difﬁculties in valuing ﬁrms' stocks, particularly for non-tradable shares. For this reason, pure stock-for-stock
was not a popular payment method before the mid-2000s. As seen from Table 1, over 99% of stock acquisitions took place after the 2005 split share structure reform.
Moreover, the category ofMixed PYMT in our study refers to all methods of payment different from all-cash or all-stock. They include acquisitions made with mixed
payments (e.g. cash and stock), debt-arrangements, and asset swaps.
7 As evidence, a survey of 130 listed Chinese ﬁrms undertaken by the Shenying andWanguo Securities Co., Ltd. documents that, on average, 40million US dollars are
owed by the controlling shareholders to their listed companies in the form of accounts receivable or lending to the parent ﬁrms (Liu and Lu, 2007). In addition, Jiang et
al. (2010) claim that “during 1996–2006, tens of billions in RMB were siphoned [through inter-corporate loans] from hundreds of Chinese listed ﬁrms by controlling
shareholders” (p.2). The authors explain that these inter-corporate loans can be found in the balance sheets of the majority of listed ﬁrms in China and are typically
reported as “Other Receivables”. A more in-depth discussion of the OREC variable can be found in Section 4.2.
8 According to Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. (2010), the separation of cash ﬂow and control rights tends to give blockholders ef-
fective control on the ﬁrms by only holding a relatively low proportion of shares, via pyramid structures and cross-holding among ﬁrms. The probability and danger of
the exploitation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder (i.e. “tunneling”) is high if these two agents do not have the same interests. A more in-depth
discussion of the DIF_Blockholders variable can be found in Section 4.2.
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4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Do cash holdings help predict the probability of being a bidder?
Following Harford (1999), we ﬁrst study the link between ﬁrms' characteristics and acquisition decisions. In particular, by inves-
tigatingwhether high cash reserves are associatedwith a higher chance of attempting acquisitions, we examinewhether the behavior
of cash-rich ﬁrms is consistent with the agency costs of free cash ﬂow explanation. To this end, we estimate the following model
whereby the dependent variable is coded as one if the ﬁrm announces a bid in year t+ 1, and zero otherwise:
Pr Bidder ¼ 1ð Þi;tþ1 ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Xcashi;t þ b2 Returni;t þ b3Qi;t þ b4ROAi;t þ b5Salesgrowthi;t þ b6NWCi;t
þ b7Leveragei;t þ b8PEi;t þ b9Sizei;t þ b10Shareholding CEOi;t þ b11Blockholdersi;t þ b12SOEsi;t
þ b13ROAi;t  Qi;t þ vi þ vt þ vj þ vp þ εi;t
ð1Þ
The subscript i indexes ﬁrms; t, years (t= 1998–2015); j, industries; and p, provinces. Xk,i,t is a vector of explanatory variables, in-
cluding ﬁrms' ﬁnancial characteristics and ownership structure variables, which might affect ﬁrms' acquisition decisions (Harford,
1999). Our primary variable of interest is unexpected (excess) cash (Xcash), deﬁned as the difference between real cash holdings
and the optimal cash level predicted by the Opler et al. (1999, hereafter OPSW) model.9 Return represents annual stock returns;
Tobin (Q), the market-to-book ratio; ROA, the return on assets; Sales growth, the annual rate of growth of real sales; NWC, the ratio
of net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets; Leverage, the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term
debt to total assets; PE, the price-to-earnings ratio; Size, the natural logarithm of total assets. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise. Blockholders is the percentage
9 Deﬁnitions of all variables used in this paper can be found in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 describes in detail how Xcash is calculated.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Non-Bidders Bidders All Diff.Mean Diff.Median
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Cash 0.175 0.137 0.154 0.128 0.171 0.135 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Xcash 0 −0.009 0 −0.006 0 −0.008 0.61 0.08⁎
Size 20.58 20.4 21.06 20.91 20.65 20.48 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Employees 4361 1934 5867 2552 4610 2019 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
ROA 0.03 0.035 0.03 0.029 0.03 0.034 0.87 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Sales growth 0.141 0.071 0.176 0.085 0.147 0.073 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Return 0.295 0.07 0.394 0.117 0.311 0.077 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
CAPEX 0.056 0.04 0.054 0.04 0.056 0.04 0.12 0.83
PE 108.9 35.92 85.73 31.7 105.2 35.33 0.66 0.00⁎⁎⁎
CF 0.054 0.058 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.47 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Var_CF 0.111 0.088 0.11 0.088 0.111 0.088 0.60 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Tobin 2.039 1.57 2.095 1.513 2.048 1.562 0.03 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Leverage 0.192 0.173 0.219 0.21 0.196 0.179 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
NWC −0.036 −0.016 −0.089 −0.086 −0.044 −0.027 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
OREC 0.041 0.013 0.032 0.013 0.04 0.013 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.25
Blockholders 0.385 0.364 0.37 0.355 0.383 0.363 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Payout 55.3% 57.9% 55.7% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Shareholding_CEO 34.5% 24.6% 32.9% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
DIF_Blockholders 31.8% 42.3% 33.5% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
SOEs 60.1% 65.2% 60.9% 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
Notes: ﬁrms that are ﬂagged as bidders (non-bidders) are those who did (did not) announce a bid in a given year. Cash (Cash-to-assets ratios) is the ratio of the sum of
cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Xcash is the unexpected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW (1999)model estimatedwith the ﬁxed-effects estima-
tor. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Employees is the number of employees. ROA is return on assets. Sales growth is the annual rate of growth of real sales.
Return is the annual stock returns. CAPEX is deﬁned as the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio. CF is the ratio of the sum of
net proﬁts and depreciation to total assets. Var_CF is the mean of the standard deviations of the cash ﬂow over total assets for all ﬁrms in a given industry in a given
year. Tobin (Q) is themarket-to-book ratio. Leverage is the ratio of the sumof short- and long-term debt to total assets.NWC is the ratio of net working capital (working
capital minus cash holdings) to total assets. OREC is the ratio of other receivables scaled by total assets. Blockholders is the percentage of shares controlled by the largest
shareholder. Payout is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm is paying dividends in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Shareholding_CEO is a dummy var-
iable that takes the value of one if theﬁrm's CEO is holding shares in his/her own company, and 0 otherwise.DIF_Blockholders is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the ﬁrm's blockholder's cash ﬂow ownership is lower than the controlling ownership in a given year, and 0 otherwise. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the
value of 1 if the ﬁrm is state owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise. For the last four dummy variables (Payout, Shareholding_CEO, DIF_Blockholders, SOEs), we present
the percentage of ﬁrms for which each dummy variable takes value of one in the sample. All variables (with the exception of the dummies) are deﬂated using the GDP
deﬂator. Diff.Mean and Diff.Median are the p-values associated with the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of medians of corre-
sponding variables between bidders and non-bidders. *, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
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of shares controlled by the largest shareholder. SOEs is a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is state owned in a given
year, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, we include ROA ∗ Tobin to estimate the interaction effect between the two variables.
The error term in Eq. (1) consists of ﬁve components. vi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect, embracing any time-invariant ﬁrm characteristics
whichmight inﬂuence ﬁrms' acquisitions strategies, as well as the time-invariant component of themeasurement error affecting any
variable in our regression. vt is a time-speciﬁc effect, which we control for by including time dummies capturing possible business
cycle effects, as well as the impact of changes in interest rates. Year dummies also account for exogenous shocks which may poten-
tially affect ﬁrms' acquisitions decisions (e.g. the 2005 split share structure reform, the 2005 Chinese exchange rate system reform,
and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008). vj is an industry-speciﬁc effect, which we take into account by including industry dummies.10
vp is a province-speciﬁc effect, controlling for uneven developments across different provinces, whichwe take into account by includ-
ing province dummies.11 Finally, εi,t represents an idiosyncratic component.
Given the discrete and limited nature of the dependent variable and the fact that our dataset is a panel, Eq. (1) is initially estimated
using the random-effects Probit estimator, which controls for the vi component of the error term.12 In order to take into account the
potential endogeneity of some of our right-hand side variables, we further use the instrumental variable (IV) Probit method.13 We
instrument Xcash as well as all our ﬁnancing, efﬁciency, growth, and ﬁrm size variables using their own values lagged twice. Table
3 presents the results. We observe that, regardless of whether we use the random-effects Probit (column 1) or the instrumental var-
iable (IV) Probit method (column 4), the probability of being a bidder increases with the level of excess cash held (Xcash). This sug-
gests that cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to attempt acquisitions than their cash-poor counterparts. Themarginal effects suggest that
holding all other controls equal, a 10 percentage-point increase in Xcash is associatedwith a 1.59–1.89 percentage-point higher prob-
ability of engaging in M&As. This ﬁnding is consistent with results reported by Harford (1999) and Opler et al. (1999) for US ﬁrms,
with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, and with the ﬁrst part of Hypothesis I.14
Both Tobin's Q and ROA exhibit positivemarginal effects, suggesting that better performing ﬁrms aremore likely to engage in acqui-
sitions. Yet,we observe that themarginal effect associatedwith the interaction between these twovariables is negative and signiﬁcantly
different from zero. This suggests that the probability of being a bidder decreaseswhen ﬁrms have higher operating performance (ROA)
as well as valuable investment opportunities (Tobin's Q). In other words, the relation between the likelihood to make acquisitions and
Tobin's Q (ROA) is weaker for ﬁrms with higher ROA (Tobin's Q). The reason might be that when a ﬁrm has both high growth opportu-
nities and a high operating capacity, it does not need to rely on external investments likeM&As to grow and expand. Expanding via ac-
quisitions is, in fact, more likely to generate a higher price paid for the acquired assets, as well as integration expenses (Margsiri et al.,
2008). In addition, there is a relatively high uncertainty about the synergies created by the acquisitions (Moeller et al., 2005). A thor-
ough discussion of the marginal effects of other regressors included in Eq. (1) is presented in Appendix 4.
4.2. Are cash-rich ﬁrms subject to tunneling more likely to make acquisitions?
Wenext provide tests of the secondpart of Hypothesis I. In particular, in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Table 3,we investigate a particular
scenario of takeover motivation, in which controlling shareholders tunnel excess cash through M&A transactions.
Following Jiang et al. (2010), we use the ratio of other receivables to total assets (OREC) to proxy how likely primary shareholders
are of expropriating resources fromminority investors. The “Other Receivables” account is commonly used by Chinese listed ﬁrms to
record transactions with related parties. The vague deﬁnition of “Other Receivables”, as well as the low level of disclosure require-
ments make manipulation possible. This account is therefore frequently used to cover up tunneling (Li, 2010). According to Jiang et
al. (2010), tens of thousands of inter-corporate loans borrowed by controlling shareholders are classiﬁed as “Other Receivables” on
the balance sheets of Chinese listed ﬁrms, and represent a large portion of companies' total assets. In our sample, other receivables
constitute about 6.3% on average, and up to around 60% of total assets, conﬁrming the severity of the tunneling problem in China.
10 According to the industry classiﬁcation taken from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), ﬁrms in China's listed sector are assigned to one of the fol-
lowing twelve industrial sectors: Farming, forestry, animal husbandry & ﬁshing;Mining;Manufacturing; Utilities; Construction; Transportation &warehouse; Informa-
tion technology;Wholesale & retailing; Real estate; Social services; Communications & cultural; Conglomerates; Finance & insurance. Following previous literature, we
exclude the Finance & insurance sector from our study.
11 There are 31 provinces in China: Coastal provinces (Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang); Cen-
tral provinces (Chongqing, Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi); and Western provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Neimenggu,
Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Yunnan).
12 To check robustness, we also estimated Eq. (1) using a conditional ﬁxed-effects Logit model and a linear probability model. The former does not require the crucial
assumption thatﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved effectsmust be independent of the regressors. However, a drawback of theﬁxed-effects Logit estimator is that all theﬁrms for
whom the dependent variable is constant over the sample period are dropped in estimation. The estimates based on the conditional Logit estimator and the linear prob-
ability model were similar to those obtained with the random-effects Probit model. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request.
13 In all our IV speciﬁcations, we report the Wald test and the Anderson Rubin test. The former tests the null hypothesis that all regressors are exogenous, while the
latter tests whether the model is identiﬁed. In all cases, we reject the null hypothesis that all regressors are exogenous, which suggests it is appropriate to use an IV
estimator. We also ﬁnd that our model is identiﬁed, meaning that the relationship between the included endogenous regressors and the instruments is sufﬁciently
strong to justify inference from the results.
14 A positive relationship between cash holdings andM&A decisions could also be explained by the ﬁnancial constraints hypothesis, according to which cash reserves
can increase ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms' ability to invest without accessing costly external capital markets. In these circumstances, the investments made by ﬁrms
with more cash holdings would not necessarily be worse than those undertaken by other ﬁrms. Hence, ﬁrms who engage in M&As would not necessarily experience
a lower value of cash holdings. By contrast, according to the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to make poor acquisitions, and hence experience
a lower value of cash holdings. In unreported results, following Faulkender and Wang (2006), we observe a decrease in the operating value of cash for acquirer ﬁrms
with excess cash. This contradicts the ﬁnancial constraints explanation for acquisitions by cash-rich ﬁrms.We therefore conclude that the positive relationship we ob-
serve between cash holdings and M&A decisions is better explained by the free cash ﬂow hypothesis.
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We expect that the larger the size of “Other Receivables” on the balance sheet, the more likely the ﬁrm is to resort to tunneling. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we classify a ﬁrm as beingmore subject to tunneling in a given year if its OREC in that year falls in the top three deciles of the
distribution of theOREC of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry it belongs to. The remainingﬁrm-years will be considered less sub-
ject to tunneling. Similar results, not reported for brevity, were obtained when a 50% threshold was used.
As an additional check, we also use the separation of the blockholder's controlling right and her/his ownership right as an alterna-
tive proxy for the ﬁrm's tunneling incentives. In particular, we construct the dummy variableDIF_Blockholders, which takes value one
if the ﬁrm's blockholder's controlling right exceeds its cash ﬂow right in a given year, suggesting the presence of tunneling, and zero
otherwise. According to Claessens et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Jiang et al. (2010), the incentives of tunneling are great-
er when a ﬁrm has implementedmechanisms of separating cash ﬂow and control. This can be explained considering that in these cir-
cumstances, blockholders tend to have exceedingly effective control on the ﬁrms, and are able to derivemore beneﬁts from tunneling
activities by only holding a relatively low stake of shares, through pyramid structures and cross-holding among ﬁrms. We therefore
classify a ﬁrm as being subject (not subject) to tunneling in a given year if the blockholder's controlling right is (is not) greater than
his/her ownership right, i.e. if DIF_Blockholders is equal to one (zero).
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 present an analysis of the impact of tunneling onmaking acquisition decisions. In particular, this anal-
ysis is undertaken by including in Eq. (1) a dummy variable (Tunneling) equal to 1 in the presence of tunneling, and 0 otherwise, and
an interaction between this dummy variable and excess cash (Xcash). Tunneling is deﬁned based on OREC (column 2) and
Table 3
Predicting bidders using a Probit model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Xtprobit Xtprobit Xtprobit IVprobit IVprobit IVprobit
Xcash 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.187*** 0.159* 0.047 −0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.355) (0.487) (0.534)
Xcash*Tunneling 0.175** 0.172** 0.382*** 0.426***
(0.084) (0.070) (0.560) (0.593)
Tunneling 0.014** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.038) (0.028)
Return 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** −0.009 −0.008 −0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
Tobin 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
ROA 0.126** 0.142*** 0.126** 0.560** 0.706** 0.567**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (1.097) (1.151) (1.105)
ROA*Tobin −0.025* −0.026* −0.024* −0.131** −0.148** −0.132**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.234) (0.247) (0.236)
Sales growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.151 0.137 0.155
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.454) (0.445) (0.455)
NWC −0.019 −0.022 −0.017 −0.003 −0.017 −0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.093) (0.091) (0.093)
Leverage 0.038 0.033 0.039 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.127***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133)
PE 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Shareholding_CEO −0.039*** −0.039*** −0.036*** −0.040*** −0.040*** −0.036***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Blockholders −0.114*** −0.112*** −0.117*** −0.120*** −0.113*** −0.122***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.114) (0.110) (0.114)
SOEs 0.012 0.012 0.023*** 0.011 0.012 0.022**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036)
No. obs. 19,163 19,163 19,163 16,314 16,314 16,314
ρ 0.18 0.18 0.18
Wald test of exogeneity 0.04** 0.04** 0.05**
Anderson-Rubin 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
chi2 798.4 803.4 846.5 787.0 826.5 837.7
Notes: the speciﬁcationswere estimated using the random-effects Probit estimator (xtprobit) in columns 1 to 3, and the instrumental variable Probit method (IVprobit)
in columns 4 to 6, respectively. The dependent variable in all regressions is equal to one if the ﬁrm announces a bid in year t + 1, and zero otherwise. Xcash is the un-
expected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW (1999) model estimatedwith the ﬁxed-effects estimator. In columns 2 and 5, we consider a ﬁrm as being sub-
ject to tunneling if its ratio of other receivables scaled by total assets lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of all ﬁrms belonging to
the same industry each year, and 0 otherwise. In columns 3 and 6,we consider a ﬁrm as being subject to tunneling if its blockholder's cashﬂow ownership is lower than
the controlling ownership in a given year, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix 2. The table reports marginal effects and standard errors (in pa-
rentheses). Themarginal effects associatedwith the Xcash ∗ Tunneling interaction are computed based on the difference between the averagemarginal effects for Xcash
evaluated in turn for ﬁrms more and less likely to tunnel. The marginal effects associated with the ROA ∗ Tobin interaction are computed based on the ratio of the dif-
ference of the average marginal effects relative to ROA evaluated at two inﬁnitesimally close values of Tobin (near the mean), divided by the difference between these
two values (i.e. 0.0001). Time, industry, and province dummieswere included in all speciﬁcations. ρ represents the proportion of the total error variance accounted for
by unobserved heterogeneity.Wald test of exogeneity is the p-value of theWald test of exogeneity of the regressors. Anderson-Rubin is the p-value of a test for whether
themodel is identiﬁed. Chi2 represents the likelihood ratio chi-square test of overall signiﬁcance. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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DIF_Blockholders (column3). The augmented Eq. (1) is estimated using a random-effects Probitmodel. Themarginal effects associated
with the interaction terms in columns 2 and 3 are positive and signiﬁcant (0.175 and 0.172, respectively), implying that, regardless of
whetherwe useOREC orDIF_Blockholders to proxy for the tendency to expropriate, having excess cash is associatedwith a signiﬁcant-
ly higher chance of undertaking an acquisition for those ﬁrmsmore likely to tunnel compared to those less likely to do so. To put our
Probit results into economic perspective, based on results in column 2, in the presence of a 10 percentage-point increase in Xcash, the
implied probability of making a bid will be 1.75 percentage-point higher for ﬁrms that are more likely to tunnel compared with those
less likely to expropriate. In addition, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantmarginal effects associatedwith the variable Tunneling, suggesting that prac-
ticing tunneling is associated with a higher likelihood to undertake acquisitions. The results based on the IV-Probit method, reported
in columns 5 and 6, conﬁrm that the positive relationship between Xcash and the likelihood to engage in M&As is stronger for those
ﬁrms subject to tunneling. Taken together, these results suggest that Chinese ﬁrms tend to take advantage of acquisitions to tunnel
cash to their controlling shareholders, and are in line with the second part of Hypothesis I.
Next, in Table 4, we compare the average percentage of ﬁrms conducting acquisition activities, differentiating ﬁrms into those that
are more or less likely to tunnel, and those that have Xcash above (High-Xcash) or below (Low-Xcash) zero. We observe a higher pro-
portion of bidders for the High-Xcash ﬁrms compared with the Low-Xcash ones, particularly among those ﬁrms with a higher likeli-
hood of tunneling (i.e. those ﬁrms with a high ratio of other receivables to total assets, or with blockholder's cash ﬂow ownership
lower than the controlling ownership). Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicate that the differences in the mean
and median percentage of ﬁrms conducting acquisitions between the High-Xcash and Low-Xcash groups are only signiﬁcant among
ﬁrms characterized by High_Tunneling.15 Hence, the ﬁndings in this table once again support Hypothesis I, according to which cash-
rich ﬁrms are more likely to undertake M&As, especially if they are subject to tunneling. In other words, our ﬁnding suggests that
tunneling is a key reason for M&As in the Chinese context.
4.3. The choice of payment method
4.3.1. The determinants of method of payment
In order to test Hypothesis II, in this section, we initially provide an analysis of the bidder's payment choice. Following Martin
(1996) and Faccio and Masulis (2005), our model of the determinants of the method of payment is given by the following
equation:
Pr Paidbycash or stockð Þi;t ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Qi;t þ b2Xcashi;t þ b3CFi;t þ b4Leveragei;t þ b5Blockholdersi;t
þ b6Sharehoding CEOi;t þ b7SOEsi;t þ b8Experiencei;t þ b9Public dealsi;t
þ b10Size ratioi;t þ b11Unfriendlyi;t þ b12Diversifyingi;t
þ b13Completedi;t þ b14Rumori;t þ b15Competingi;t
þ b16FinancialAcquireri;t þ b17FinanicalSponsori;t þ νt þ ν j þ νp þ εi;t
ð2Þ
where the subscript i indexes ﬁrms; t indexes years (t = 1998–2015); j indexes industries; and p, provinces. The dependent var-
iable is the bidder's payment choice. Explanatory variables comprise bidder- and deal-speciﬁc attributes. Speciﬁcally, we measure
the bidder's ﬁnancial, operational and corporate conditions with Tobin's Q, the market-to-book ratio; Xcash (excess cash); CF (the
ratio of the sum of net proﬁt and depreciation to total assets); Leverage (the ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total
assets); Size (the natural logarithm of total assets); Blockholders (the percentage of shares controlled by the largest shareholder);
Shareholding_CEO (a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm's CEO holds shares in his/her own company, and 0 oth-
erwise); SOEs (a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is state owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise); and Ex-
perienced (a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the bidder has announced at least 3 takeover bids over the ﬁve years
period prior to the deal announcement, and 0 otherwise).
Wemeasure the deal's attributeswith Public_deals (a dummy variable, that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of publicﬁrms, and
0 otherwise); Size_ratio (the ratio of the transaction value divided by the bidder's market value four weeks prior to the announce-
ment); Unfriendly (a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the deal is not deﬁned as friendly by Thomson Financial SDC,
and 0 otherwise); Diversifying (a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bidder was not in the same industry as the target,
measured using the bidder's and the target's ﬁrst two digits of the primary SIC code, and 0 otherwise); Completed (a dummy variable,
which takes the value of 1 if the transaction was completed, and 0 otherwise); Rumor (a dummy variable equal to one if the transac-
tion is currently [or originally began as] a rumor, and zero otherwise); Competing (a dummy variable equal to one if a third party
launched an offer for the target while the original bid was pending, and zero otherwise); Financial Acquirer (a dummy variable
equal to one if the bidder is buying a non-ﬁnancial target company for ﬁnancial reasons rather than for strategic reasons, and zero oth-
erwise); and Financial Sponsor (a dummy variable equal to one if the deal has any buyout or ﬁnancial sponsor involvement on either
the buying side or the selling side, and zero otherwise).16
15 Both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test also indicate that among the High-Xcash ﬁrms, High_Tunneling ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to undertake ac-
quisitions than their Low_Tunneling counterparts, regardless of how tunneling is measured.
16 We do not include Runup_stock, Runup_market and Sigma_stock in the regressions as this would signiﬁcantly reduce the numbers of observations. However, the
inclusion of these variables produced qualitatively similar results. These are not presented for brevity, but are available upon request.
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Our estimates of Eq. (2) are reported in columns 1 to 4 of Table 5. Speciﬁcally, in columns 1 and 3, we use a Probit model in which
the dependent variable is 1 if the deal is ﬁnanced only by cash in year t + 1, and zero otherwise. By contrast, the speciﬁcations in col-
umns 2 and 4 are estimated using an ordered Probit estimator, whereby the dependent variable takes value of 1 if the acquisition in
year t + 1 is stock-ﬁnanced; 2, if it is mixed-ﬁnanced; and 3, if it is cash-ﬁnanced.We estimate all regressions by accounting for clus-
tering, which takes into account the intra-class correlation within the same ﬁrm.
It is noteworthy that if poor ﬁnancial or corporate conditions, which play a crucial role in payment considerations, also prevent
some potential bidders from taking part in acquisition activity, then we may understate the importance of the determinants of the
choice of paymentmethod. As shown in Table 2, there are signiﬁcant differences in ﬁrm characteristics between bidders and non-bid-
ders, which suggest that our ﬁnancial variables could be determined endogenously. Additionally, the method of payment could be a
matter of choice on the part of the bidder. To control for this selection bias, we implement Heckman's (1976, 1979) two-step proce-
dure and report the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. Speciﬁcally, in theﬁrst stage, based on Eq. (1), we estimate a selection (Prob-
it) model for the probability of making a bid for each ﬁrm-year. We then calculate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation. In the
second stage, we include the inverseMills ratio in the second-step equation to correct for a potential selection problem in our sample.
If the inverseMill's ratio does not carry a signiﬁcant sign, thenwe can conﬁrm that the selection bias does not have a signiﬁcant impact
on the second-stage equation for the choice of payment methods (Heckman, 1976, 1979).17
Weobserve that thebidder's stock valuation (Tobin's Q) has a signiﬁcant andnegativemarginal effect in all speciﬁcations, suggesting
that better investment prospects are associatedwith a lower likelihood of cash payments. Focusing on columns1 and 2,we observe that
themarginal effect associatedwith Tobin's Q is−0.020,which suggests that a one standard deviation (1.5) increase in the bidder's stock
valuation is associated with a 3.0 percentage-point decline in the probability of the ﬁrm using cash in acquisitions. This ﬁnding is con-
sistent with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, according to which acquiring ﬁrms with higher investment opportunities
would rather not spend cash in acquisitions since they face higher opportunity costs of holding cash. It is also consistent with the ﬁrst
part of Hypothesis II. A thorough discussion of the other determinants of the payment method is presented in Appendix 5.
4.3.2. Financial constraints and method of payment
In order to test the second part of Hypothesis II, we next investigate whether the opportunity costs of cash holdings, as measured
by the sensitivity of cash payment decisions to growth opportunities (Tobin's Q), is higher for ﬁrms that face higher ﬁnancial con-
straints compared to their ﬁnancially healthier counterparts. To this end, an interaction term between Tobin's Q and a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the ﬁrm faces a high degree of ﬁnancing constraints is added to Eq. (2). If the second part of Hypothesis II is satisﬁed, then
the marginal effect on this interaction term should be negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Based on existing literature, we use ﬁve different criteria to proxy for the level of ﬁnancial constraints that bidders face. The ﬁrst
criterion is size, whereby it is assumed that small ﬁrms usually do not have sufﬁcient net worth and collateral values, as well as a suf-
ﬁciently long track record comparedwith large ﬁrms. Thus, theywill bemore vulnerable to asymmetric information in credit markets
andwill facemore difﬁculties in obtaining external ﬁnancing (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Beck et al., 2005; Clementi and Hopenhayn,
2006; Guariglia, 2008).
Second, followingKaplan and Zingales (1997) andWhited andWu (2006), we construct theKZ andWW indexes to proxy for ﬁrm-
speciﬁc levels of ﬁnancial constraints. A ﬁrm is more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained if it has a higher level of the KZ orWW index.
These two indexes are described in detail in Appendix 2.
17 As we ﬁnd negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the inverse Mills ratios in Table 5, we reject the null hypothesis of independence of the second-stage equations
from the selection equations, suggesting the prevalence of self-selection.
Table 4
Excess cash and tunneling.
Constraints criteria Low-Xcash High-Xcash Diff.Mean Diff.Median
OREC
High_Tunneling 15.74% 19.57% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_Tunneling 15.55% 16.11 % 0.34 0. 34
Diff.Mean 0.78 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.78 0.00***
DIF_Blockholders
High_Tunneling 17.82% 20.32% 0.05* 0.05*
Low_Tunneling 14.41% 15.34% 0.12 0.12
Diff.Mean 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.00*** 0.00***
Notes: this table presents the average proportion of bidders in the high- and low-Xcash groups. Xcash is the unexpected (excess) cash holdings predicted by the OPSW
(1999) model estimated with the ﬁxed-effects estimator. A ﬁrm is considered to be in the high- (low-) Xcash group in a given year if its Xcash is above (below) zero.
High_Tunneling (Low_Tunneling) is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the ﬁrm ismore (less) likely to tunnel, and 0 otherwise. According to the ﬁrst criterion, we consider
a ﬁrm as being subject to tunneling if its ratio of other receivables scaled by total assets lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of all
ﬁrms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining ﬁrm-years will be classiﬁed as less likely to tunnel. According to the second criterion, we consider a ﬁrm
as being subject to tunneling if its blockholder's cash ﬂowownership is lower than the controlling ownership in a given year. The remaining ﬁrm-yearswill be classiﬁed
as less likely to tunnel. Diff.Mean and Diff.Median are the p-values associated with the t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of me-
dians of the average proportion of cash payments between high- and low-Xcash groups and between High- and Low-Tunneling groups (medians are not reported for
brevity). *, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
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Third, prior literature documents that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms tend to cut or reduce dividend payout to ﬁnance their de-
sired investment projects or cover their debt obligations (Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; Almeida et
al., 2004; Almeida and Campello, 2007). We therefore expect ﬁrms that pay no dividends to face higher capital market
imperfections.
Following this literature, we classify a ﬁrm as facing a relatively high degree of ﬁnancial constraints in a given year if its size (mea-
sured by total real assets or number of employees) falls in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of the size of all ﬁrms operating
in the same industry as thatﬁrm, in that given year (columns 5 and 6 of Table 5); if itsKZ orWW index in that year falls in the top three
deciles of the distribution of the indexes of all ﬁrms operating in the same industry as that ﬁrm, in that given year (columns 7 and 8);
Table 5
Determinants of the method of payment taking ﬁnancial constraints into consideration.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probit Oprobit Probit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit
Total Assets No. of Employees KZ WW Dividend Paying
Tobin −0.020*** −0.020*** −0.015*** −0.015*** −0.001 −0.011** −0.013*** −0.014*** −0.008*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
High_FC*Tobin −0.021*** −0.010* −0.013* −0.003 −0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Xcash 0.119 0.070 0.012 −0.029 −0.022 −0.024 −0.049 −0.028 −0.059
(0.088) (0.084) (0.088) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084)
CF 0.479*** 0.448*** 0.344*** 0.319*** 0.255** 0.276*** 0.288*** 0.308*** 0.236**
(0.113) (0.101) (0.113) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104)
Leverage 0.019 0.016 −0.042 −0.041 −0.040 −0.046 −0.017 −0.036 −0.021
(0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
Blockholders 0.017 0.044 0.068 0.095** 0.083* 0.091** 0.089** 0.090** 0.080*
(0.046) (0.042) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Shareholding_CEO 0.041** 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.058***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
SOEs −0.007 −0.002 −0.025 −0.019 −0.018 −0.019 −0.018 −0.018 −0.018
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Experienced 0.057*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.033** 0.027* 0.031** 0.033** 0.032** 0.029**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Public_deals −0.107** −0.124*** −0.133*** −0.147*** −0.140*** −0.146*** −0.150*** −0.148*** −0.146***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Size_ratio −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unfriendly −0.113*** −0.105*** −0.113*** −0.105*** −0.103*** −0.108*** −0.105*** −0.105*** −0.103***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Diversifying 0.003 −0.001 0.008 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Completed −0.112*** −0.119*** −0.110*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.116*** −0.114***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Rumors 0.010 −0.004 −0.026 −0.040 −0.032 −0.038 −0.037 −0.040 −0.032
(0.131) (0.133) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) (0.126)
Competing −0.094*** −0.108*** −0.098*** −0.111*** −0.110*** −0.114*** −0.112*** −0.111*** −0.111***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Financial Acquirer 0.363*** 0.360*** 0.345*** 0.342*** 0.350*** 0.345*** 0.337*** 0.340*** 0.341***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.074) (0.072) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Financial Sponsor −0.201*** −0.218*** −0.193*** −0.211*** −0.213*** −0.208*** −0.210*** −0.211*** −0.208***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Inverse Mills Ratio −0.241*** −0.228*** −0.185*** −0.219*** −0.226*** −0.216*** −0.213***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045)
No. obs. 3035 3043 3035 3043 3043 3030 3043 3042 3043
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
chi2 388.8 2082.7 416.8 2143.6 2006.1 2150.9 2271.0 2140.5 2359.1
Notes: the speciﬁcations in columns 1 and 3were estimated using thepooled Probit estimator. In this case, the dependent variable is one if the deal wasﬁnanced only by
cash in year t + 1, and zero otherwise. The remaining speciﬁcations were estimated using the ordered Probit estimator. In this case, the dependent variable takes a
value of 1 for all stock deals, 2 for mixed deals, and 3 for all cash deals, in year t + 1. In columns 5 to 9, we include an interaction term between Tobin's Q and a
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm faces a relatively high levels of ﬁnancial constraints (High_FC). Speciﬁcally, in columns 5 and 6, we consider a ﬁrm as
ﬁnancially constrained if its size (measured by total assets or number of employees) lies in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values
of all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry in each year, and 0 otherwise. In columns 7 and 8, we consider a ﬁrm as ﬁnancially constrained if its KZ or WW index
falls in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding values of all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry each year, and 0 otherwise. In column 9, we con-
sider a ﬁrm as ﬁnancially constrained if it is not paying dividends in a given year, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix 2. The table reports mar-
ginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses). The marginal effects associated with the Tobin ∗ High_FC interaction are computed based on the difference between
the average marginal effects for Tobin evaluated in turn at High_FC = 1 and High_FC = 0. Time, industry, and province dummies were included in all speciﬁcations.
Apart from columns 1 and 2, we use Heckman's (1976, 1979) two-stage approach by introducing the Inverse Mills Ratio into each regression to take account of the se-
lection bias. Chi2 represents the likelihood ratio chi-square test of overall signiﬁcance. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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and if the ﬁrm has not made any cash dividend payment in the year (column 9).18,19 We then construct a dummy variable (High_FC),
which is equal to 1 in a given year if the ﬁrm is likely to face a relatively high degree of ﬁnancial constraints, and 0 otherwise.
The results of this test appear in columns 5 to 9 of Table 5. Ordered Probit estimates of themodiﬁed Eq. (2) are presented,whereby
the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the acquisition in year t+ 1 is stock-ﬁnanced, 2 if it is mixed-ﬁnanced, and 3 if it is cash-
ﬁnanced. The inverseMills ratio is included in all speciﬁcations to control for selection problems. Once again,we observe that Tobin's Q
has a signiﬁcant and negative marginal effect in most speciﬁcations. Furthermore, in line with the second part of Hypothesis II, we
observe that the marginal effects associated with the interactions between Tobin's Q and High_FC are generally negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant regardless of the criterion used tomeasure ﬁnancial constraints.20 This suggests that in the presence of a rising Tobin's
Q, compared to their ﬁnancially healthier counterparts, ﬁnancially constrained bidders are more likely to save cash and use stock to
pay for the acquisitions. To put our Ordered Probit results into economic perspective, based on column 5, if the bidder's Tobin's Q
rises by one standard deviation (1.5), the implied probability of using cash as payment drops by an additional 3.1 percentage points
for ﬁrmsmore likely to face ﬁnancial constraints, relative to ﬁnancially healthier ﬁrms. This ﬁnding can be explained by the opportu-
nity cost of holding cash hypothesis, according to which ﬁnancially constrained acquirers with better investment opportunities value
cashmore than their ﬁnancially healthier counterparts (Alshwer et al., 2011). Therefore, since holdingmore cash givesmore ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility and avoids the high opportunity cost of forgoing positive net present value (NPV) projects in the future, theseﬁrmsprefer to
use stock toﬁnance the deals. By contrast, ﬁrmswith easier access to ﬁnancialmarketsmay not have such a strong preference for pay-
ment methods in acquisitions, since they may easily fund their current or future investments using debt or equity.
As a further test of the second part of Hypothesis II, we next provide descriptive statistics of the average proportion of cash pay-
ments for different categories of bidding ﬁrms (Table 6). Speciﬁcally, based on ﬁrms' ﬁnancial conditions and Tobin's Q, we partition
bidding ﬁrm-years into 4 sub-groups: Group 1 (ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrmswith low Q), Group 2 (ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrmswith
high Q), Group 3 (ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrmswith low Q), and Group 4 (ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrmswith high Q).21We then
compute the average proportion of cash payments (Payment_cash) across the four sub-samples. We observe that regardless of how
ﬁnancing constraints are measured, for the ﬁnancially constrained group, the average percentage of cash transactions for the low Q
group is much higher than the one for the high Q group. The differences in thesemeans andmedians between the two groups are al-
ways signiﬁcant at the 1% level.22
These statistics suggest that relatively ﬁnancially constrained bidders with low investment opportunities are more likely to use
cash to ﬁnance their acquisitions. This ﬁnding is in line with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al., 2011),
according to which, especially for ﬁrms facing high investment opportunities, ﬁnancial constraints increase the opportunity cost of
holding cash. It also provides further support to the second part of Hypothesis II.
4.4. The valuation effects of takeovers
4.4.1. Short-run analysis
4.4.1.1. Abnormal returns for different methods of payment. In this section, we use traditional short-window event studies to investigate
market reactions of acquirers' stocks across different methods of payment. Table 7 displays bidders' cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) within the three-day (t = −1, +1) and ﬁve-day (t = −2, +2) windows of a merger announcement over the period
1998–2015.23 In line with Chi et al. (2011), Zhou et al. (2015), and Black et al. (2015), for all bidders (n= 2887), the cumulative ab-
normal returns of the acquirers over a three-day and ﬁve-day event window are statistically signiﬁcant and positive, taking values of
1.85% and 2.16%, respectively. Signiﬁcant and positive abnormal returns suggest that Chinese stockmarkets react positively to the an-
nouncements of bidding. This could be due to the fact that although acquisitions are more likely to destroy value, they may be less
wasteful than investing internally in loss-making projects, especially when the acquirers have substantial cash ﬂows and few growth
opportunities.24 Alternatively, Chi et al. (2011) attribute the positive announcement returns to the low M&A competition in China.
18 Given the signiﬁcant capital market imperfections characterizing the Chinese market, the majority of Chinese companies pay stock dividends rather than cash div-
idends (Lin et al., 2010).
19 The reason why we use a relatively small (30%) threshold to classify ﬁrms as facing relatively high ﬁnancial constraints is that Chinese acquirers are typically large
ﬁrms and are therefore less likely to be affected by capital market imperfections. However, similar results were obtainedwhen using 25% and 50% thresholds. For brev-
ity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request.
20 One exception is observed in column 8, whichmakes use of theWW index to measure the degree of ﬁnancing constraints faced by ﬁrms. In this case, themarginal
effect associated with the interaction is not statistically signiﬁcant.
21 We classify aﬁrm into thehigh- (low-)Q group in a given year if its Tobin's Q is above (below) themedian value of theQ of allﬁrms operating in the same industry in
that year.
22 Additionally, we observe that regardless of how ﬁnancing constraints aremeasured, for the high-Q group, the average percentage of cash transactions for theﬁnan-
cially constrained group ismuch lower than the one for the ﬁnancially unconstrained group, with the differences inmeans andmedians being statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
23 See Appendix 2 for details on how bidders' (cumulative) abnormal returns are constructed.When studying valuation effects, we exclude 1109 deals due to relevant
trading information on the acquirer beingmissing. Furthermore, as an additional sensitivity test, we followGolubov et al. (2012) andwinsorize the 1% tails of the CARs'
distribution to control for outliers. For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request.
24 A ﬁrmwith limited growth prospects could beneﬁt by taking on unanticipated investment opportunities such asM&As to reduce free cash ﬂow problems and ease
overinvestment (Smith and Kim, 1994).
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When we partition bidders on the basis of their methods of payment, we see that stock bidders generate themost signiﬁcant and
largest abnormal returns, regardless of the eventwindows used (CAR3= 11.67%; CAR5= 15.13%; n= 265). Bidderswithmixed pay-
ments follow (CAR3= 0.88%, CAR5= 0.57%, n= 137), and cash bidders are last (CAR3= 0.86%, CAR5= 0.87%, n= 2485). Both the
Table 6
Choice of method of payment taking growth opportunities (Tobin's Q) and ﬁnancial constraints into account.
Constraints criterion Low-Q High-Q Diff.
Mean
Diff.
Median
Size (Real assets)
High_FC 84.21% 66.01% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 86.49% 84.37% 0.10* 0.10*
Diff. Mean 0.53 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.53 0.00***
Size (Employees)
High_FC 86.00% 68.97% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 86.36% 82.11% 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff. Mean 0.87 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.87 0.00***
KZ
High_FC 85.91% 74.78% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 86.77% 85.30% 0.52 0.52
Diff. Mean 0.62 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.62 0.00***
WW
High_FC 83.73% 73.88% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 88.42% 86.39% 0.26 0.26
Diff. Mean 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff.Median 0.00*** 0.00***
Payout
High_FC 81.12% 68.80% 0.00*** 0.00***
Low_FC 89.19% 85.50% 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff. Mean 0.00*** 0.00***
Diff. Median 0.00*** 0.00***
Notes: this table presents the average proportion of cash payments (Payment_cash) differentiatingﬁrms between
High- and Low-Q groups, and high and low levels of ﬁnancial constraints. A ﬁrm is considered to be in the High-
(Low-) Q group in a given year if its Tobin's Q lies above (below) themedian value of theQs of all ﬁrms operating
in its same industry in a given year.High_FC and Low_FC are dummyvariables, equal to 1 respectively if theﬁrm is
more likely to face high and low ﬁnancial constraints relatively to all ﬁrms operating in the same industry they
belong to in a given year, and0 otherwise.With theﬁrst two criteria,we consider aﬁrmasﬁnancially constrained
if its size (measured by total assets or number or employees) lies in the bottom three deciles of the distribution of
the corresponding values of all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry each year. The remaining ﬁrm-years will be
classiﬁed as facing a low level of ﬁnancial constraints. For the KZ andWW indexes, we consider a ﬁrm as ﬁnan-
cially constrained if itsKZ orWW index lies in the top three deciles of the distribution of the corresponding index-
es for allﬁrmsbelonging to the same industry in a given year. The remainingﬁrm-yearswill be classiﬁed as facing
lowﬁnancial constraints. For the last criterion (Payout),we partitionﬁrms according to their dividendpayout sta-
tus. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrmwill be classiﬁed as facing low ﬁnancial constraints if it is paying dividends in a given year,
and as facing high ﬁnancial constraints, otherwise.Diff.Mean andDiff.Median are the p-values associatedwith the
t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test for equality ofmeans and equality ofmedians of the average proportion of
cash payment between High- and Low-Q groups, and High_FC and Low_FC groups (medians are not reported for
brevity). *, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 7
Cumulative abnormal returns by methods of payment between January 1998 and December 2015.
Stock only Mixed PYMT Cash only All Bidders Diff.Mean Diff.Median
CAR3 11.67%⁎⁎⁎ 0.88%⁎ 0.86%⁎⁎⁎ 1.85%⁎⁎⁎
(p-value) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
No. obs. 265 137 2485 2887
CAR5 15.13%⁎⁎⁎ 0.57%⁎⁎ 0.87%⁎⁎⁎ 2.16%⁎⁎⁎
(p-value) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.00⁎⁎⁎
No. obs. 265 137 2485 2887
Notes: cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using themarketmodel with parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to
the deal announcement for different day event windows around the announcement (day 0). CAR3 and CAR5 are the average cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day
(−1, +1) and 5-day (−2, +2) event windows, respectively, where 0 denotes the announcement.Diff.Mean and Diff.Median are the p-values associatedwith the t-test
and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equality of means and equality of medians of the cumulative abnormal returns between cash and stock acquisitions (medians are
not reported for brevity). *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test indicate that the differences in themean andmedian CARs between cash and stock acquisitions
are statistically signiﬁcant.
In short, the results show that the market has different perceptions of acquisitions depending on the methods of payment used.
The lowest announcement returns associated with cash payments are in line with Black et al.'s (2015) ﬁndings on the Chinese econ-
omy, aswell aswithHypothesis III.We attribute this to the fact that, due to the lower opportunity costs of holding cash, cash-acquiring
ﬁrms are more likely to waste cash on unproﬁtable acquisitions. Other factors may also contribute to a negative market reaction for
cash acquisitions. First, bidders have a greater probability to offer high acquisition premiums for cash transactions (Fishman, 1989).
Given the high degree of information asymmetry prevalent in the Chinese stockmarket, cash payments aremore likely to be accepted
by target ﬁrms only if cash offers are attractive or exceed their true value. Second, when stock payments are used in takeover trans-
actions, taxes are deferred until the stock is sold. However, cash payments face immediate capital gains tax implications. Thus, the tax-
deferred option in stock may be valued by the market.
Fig. 1 presents a plot of the average acquirer's cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) for the bidding ﬁrms in the event window (t=
−30, +30). We observe that during the event window, the CAAR starts to decline, and hits a trough around day−12. This is then
followed by a picking up until day +4, and a slight decline between day +5 and +30. The most sizeable CAAR increase occurs be-
tween day−5 and +4, suggesting more signiﬁcant stock price reactions around the announcement day.
Fig. 2 shows the CAARs for the bidding ﬁrms in the event window (t=−30, +30), differentiating by method of payment. Spe-
ciﬁcally, Panels A, B and C report the average acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns for all stock deals, mixed deals and, all cash
deals respectively. Panel A shows a positive price reaction for the pure stock acquisition announcement. In particular, there is a signif-
icant increase between days−2 and+5. The CAAR is relatively ﬂat prior to and following this period. Panel B also shows a generally
positive price reaction for the acquisition announcements with mixed payments. However, we observe that the CAAR starts falling
after day +2, and, over the event window, it starts to drift down becoming negative in day +20. For the pure cash acquisitions in
Panel C, the CAAR is negative 10 days before the announcement. It then starts to pick up reaching its maximum value of 1.5% on
day 1. After that, during the post-announcement period between days +1 and+30, it decreases marginally. Overall, the positive re-
action for the stock deals is signiﬁcantly larger than that for deals ﬁnanced with cash or mixed payments.
Combined, the results in Figs. 1 and2 suggest that information aboutM&As starts to leak to themarket before the ofﬁcial announce-
ment (around day−12). In addition, the lowest CAAR is associatedwith cash payments, while themarket reaction is most positive for
stock announcements, which is entirely consistent with Hypothesis III and with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis.25
4.4.1.2. Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidders' CARs. Next, we further investigate the relationship between method of payment
and bidders' abnormal returns using a multivariate OLS regression analysis with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
at the ﬁrm level. Following Golubov et al. (2012) and Black et al. (2015), our baseline regression model is:
CARi;t ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Payment cashi;t þ b2Qi;t þ b3Xcashi;t
þ b4CFi;t þ b5Leveragei;t þ b6Blockholdersi;t þ b7Sharehoding CEOi;t
þ b8SOEsi;t þ b9Experiencei;t þ b10Public dealsi;t þ b11Size ratio
þ b12Unfriendlyi;t þ b13Diversifyingi;t þ b14Completedi;t þ b15Rumori;t
þ b16Competingi;t þ b17FinancialAcquireri;t þ b18FinanicalSponsori;t
þ b19Runup stocki;t þ b20Runup marketi;t þ b21Sigma stocki;t þ vt þ vj þ vp þ εi;t
ð3Þ
where the independent variables are bidder-, target-, deal-, and market-speciﬁc factors. The former include the payment dummy
(Payment_cash), Tobin's Q (Q), excess cash (Xcash), cash ﬂow (CF), leverage (Leverage), the percentage of shares controlled by the
largest shareholder (Blockholders), an indicator of CEO shareholding (Shareholding_CEO), a state ownership dummy (SOEs), and an
indicator of experience of the bidder (Experienced). Target-speciﬁc factors include an indicator of the target's listing status
(Public_deals). Deal-speciﬁc-factors include the relative size of the deal (Size_ratio), an indicator of acquisition attitude (Unfriend-
ly), an indicator of whether the bidder's and target's industries coincide (Diversifying), an indicator of deal completion (Complet-
ed), an indicator of rumored deals (Rumors), an indicator of competing bids (Competing), an indicator of ﬁnancial bidder (Financial
Acquirer), and an indicator of any buyouts and ﬁnancial sponsor involvement (Financial Sponsor). Lastly, market-speciﬁc factors
include stock performance prior to the announcement (Runup_stock), market performance (Runup_market), and risk prior to
the announcement (Sigma_stock). In all speciﬁcations, we also incorporate year, industry and province ﬁxed-effects.
Table 8 presents the results of this analysis, which is based on the Heckman two-stage procedure to control for the self-selection
bias. Speciﬁcally, as in Section 4.3.1, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation based on a selection (Probit) model (Eq.
(1)) for the probability ofmaking a bid.We then include the inverseMills ratios in theOLS regressions of the bidders' CARs (Eq. (3)) to
correct for the potential selection problem in our sample. The dependent variable in the regression is the ﬁve-day cumulative abnor-
mal return (CAR5) in columns 1 and 3, and the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR3) in columns 2 and 4, respectively.
As shown in columns 1 and 2, after controlling for various bidder-, target-, deal-, and market-speciﬁc factors, we ﬁnd that the
coefﬁcient on Payment_cash is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which is in line with Hypothesis III and with the
opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis. Keeping other factors constant, the magnitude of the coefﬁcients in columns 1 and 2
25 If we separate deals according to the dummy Payment_cash, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly more positive market reaction for non-cash acquisitions compared to the ones
undertaken with cash payments.
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Fig. 2. Acquirers' cumulative average abnormal returns (−30, +30) differentiating across methods of payment. This ﬁgure shows the average cumulative abnormal
returns (CAARs) between January 1998 andDecember 2015, for the bidding ﬁrm in the (−30,+30) eventwindow,where 0 denotes the announcement, differentiating
across methods of payment. The abnormal returns are calculated as the differences between the realized returns and the market model benchmark returns, with the
parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement. Panels A, B and C report the average acquirers' cumu-
lative abnormal returns for all stock deals, mixed deals, and all cash deals, respectively.
Fig. 1. Acquirers' cumulative average abnormal return (−30, +30). This ﬁgure shows the average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) between January 1998 and De-
cember 2015, for the bidding ﬁrm in the (−30, +30) event window, where 0 denotes the announcement. The abnormal returns are calculated as the differences be-
tween the realized returns and the market model benchmark returns, with the parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to
the deal announcement.
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suggests that the use of cash payments in acquisitions is associated with a 7.4 and 5.9 percentage-point lower CAR5 and CAR3,
respectively.
We also observe that the bidder's announcement returns (CAR5 and CAR3) are signiﬁcantly and positively associated with Tobin's
Q. This suggests that themarket reacts positively to increases in bidders' investment opportunities. In columns 3 and 4, we introduce
in Eq. (3) an interaction term between Tobin's Q and Payment_cash. We observe that this additional term exhibits a negative coefﬁ-
cient. In column 3, the magnitude of the interaction term is−0.016, while the magnitude of the coefﬁcient on Tobin's Q is 0.017.
This suggests that when Tobin's Q rises by one standard deviation (1.5), the announcement returns (CAR5) will rise by 2.6 percentage
points for non-cash bidders (0.017 ∗ 1.5), but only by around 0.15 percentage point [(0.017− 0.016) ∗ 1.5] for cash bidders. This can
be explained considering that cash bidders with valuable investment opportunities are likely to face a lower opportunity cost of
Table 8
Determinants of the short-run cumulative abnormal returns of the bidders.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR5 CAR3 CAR5 CAR3
Payment_cash −0.074*** −0.059*** −0.035*** −0.035***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
Tobin 0.006*** 0.004** 0.017*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Payment_cash *Tobin −0.016*** −0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Xcash 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.010
(0.030) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023)
CF 0.089** 0.076** 0.089** 0.076**
(0.045) (0.033) (0.044) (0.032)
Leverage 0.020 0.025** 0.019 0.024**
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011)
Blockholders 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Shareholding_CEO −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
SOEs −0.009** −0.007** −0.008* −0.006*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Experienced −0.008** −0.005 −0.007* −0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Public_deals 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.005
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014)
Size_ratio 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unfriendly 0.000 −0.002 0.001 −0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Diversifying 0.010*** 0.005 0.010*** 0.005*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Completed 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Rumors −0.053* −0.030 −0.049 −0.028
(0.029) (0.020) (0.033) (0.022)
Competing 0.011* 0.007 0.010 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Financial Acquirer −0.051** −0.029* −0.043** −0.024
(0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Financial Sponsor 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.049*** 0.030***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
Runup_stock −0.036*** −0.026*** −0.034*** −0.024***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Runup_market 0.017 0.013 0.014 0.011
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Sigma_stock 0.050 0.118 0.011 0.094
(0.107) (0.078) (0.105) (0.077)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.016 0.014 0.019 0.016
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
No. obs. 2304 2304 2304 2304
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.19
Notes: this table presents results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions for the cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day (columns 2 and 4) and 5-day event (columns 1
and 3)window, expressed in percentage terms. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns, which are calculated using themarketmodel with parameters
estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement, for different day eventwindows around the announcement (day 0).
All other variables are deﬁned in Appendix 2.We use the Heckman's (1976, 1979) two-stage approach by introducing the InverseMills Ratio into each regression to take
account of the selection bias. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors, which are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. Time dummies and
industry dummies were included in all speciﬁcations. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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holding cash than the average cash bidder, aswell as higher agency costs (e.g. tunneling). The negative coefﬁcient associatedwith the
interaction between Tobin's Q and Payment_cash also suggests that a higher Tobin's Q reinforces the negative association between
Payment_cash and the CARs. In other words, if bidders with valuable investment opportunities use cash to ﬁnance acquisitions,
they suffer more from negative market reactions.
A thorough discussion of other determinants of bidders' CARs is presented in Appendix 6. In summary, our results on abnormal
announcement returns support Hypothesis III, according to which, in the Chinese context, stock bidders experience more positive
reactions than cash bidders.
4.4.2. Long-run analysis
4.4.2.1. Time record of bidders' annual operating performance. In the previous section, we found that cash-paying bidders have lower
abnormal announcement returns than stock-paying ones, suggesting that the market anticipates weaker future performance for
the former. In order to provide greater insights into the relationship between a ﬁrm's participation in acquisitions and long-run per-
formance, Table 9 presents the change in operating performance for bidders characterized by differentmethods of payment. First, fol-
lowing Healy et al. (1992), Harford (1999) and Linn and Switzer (2001), we use the return on assets (ROA) and cash ﬂow (CF) to
measure bidders' operating performance. According to Barber and Lyon (1996), in order to assess operating performance of corpora-
tions following major events or decisions, it is important to design a test which controls for ﬁrms with similar pre-merger
performance.26
To this end, ﬁrst, in Panels A and B of Table 9, we followHeron and Lie (2002) and analyze bidders' operating performance relative
to the median performance of ﬁrms in the same industry. Speciﬁcally, industry-adjusted operating performance (industry-adjusted
ROA, and industry-adjusted CF) is constructed as the difference between a bidder's operating performance (CF or ROA) and that of
the median ﬁrm in the same industry in a given year.
Second, in the spirit of Rau andVermaelen (1998) andHarford (1999), in Panels C andD,wematch sample ﬁrms to control for size
and cash levels. Speciﬁcally, performance-adjusted operating performance (performance-adjusted ROA, and performance-adjusted CF)
for a given bidder is constructed by subtracting the bidder's operating performance from the median performance of the ﬁrms in the
same portfolio.27 These performance-matchedmethods allow us tomake a direct comparison between the operating performance of
ﬁrms with a similar pre-event performance that engage in acquisitions and those that do not. This method therefore helps us to pro-
vide better inference about how merger deals impact bidders' operating performance.
In the columns labeled All Bidders, we report mean and median values of adjusted-ROA and adjusted-CF from year−2 to year +2
relative to the year of the acquisition announcement for the total sample.We observe that Chinese bidders generally experience a de-
crease in performance from year−1 to year+2, regardless of whetherwe use adjusted-CF or adjusted-ROA and regardless of whether
we undertake industry or performance adjustment. P-values associated with both the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test show
that, in general, these mean and median changes from year−1 to year +2 are statistically signiﬁcant.
To check whether operating performance is affected by the method of payment, we next break the bidders down into three sub-
samples: Stock only, Mixed Payment, and Cash only. We ﬁnd that the pre-acquisition operating performance is higher for bidders in
cash-ﬁnanced deals comparedwith those in stock-ﬁnanced deals, regardless of whether we use adjusted-ROA or adjusted-CF. Howev-
er, cash bidders underperform stock bidders in the post-acquisition periods.28 It is interesting to note that only cash bidders showpos-
itive adjusted performance before acquisitions, while experiencing a decrease in adjusted performance between year−1 and year
+2. For these deals, both the t-test and theWilcoxon rank-sum test signiﬁcantly reject the null hypothesis that themean andmedian
differences in adjusted performance before and after acquisitions equal zero at the 1% level. Based on themagnitude of the change in
adjusted-ROA in Panel A, the decrease in bidders' adjusted performance between year−1 and year+2 is 0.7%,which is 7 times as high
as the value of the adjusted-ROA in year 0 (0.1%). This ﬁgure is economically signiﬁcant. Theseﬁndings can be interpreted in twoways.
First, good performance prior to the bid may allow bidders to accumulate substantial cash, which may enhance management discre-
tion, as a result of whichmanagersmay then undertake low-returnmergers for their private interests. Second, it is possible that due to
a lack of investment opportunities, cash bidders with a better operating performance prior to the takeover face lower opportunity
costs of cash holdings and tend to use M&As as a way of spending excess cash.
On the contrary, we ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant increase in bidders' adjusted performance from year−1 to year +2 for stock-
ﬁnanced deals. Based on themagnitude of the change in adjusted-ROA in Panel A, the increase in adjusted performance between year
−1 and year +2 is 2.7%, which is about 1.5 times as high as the absolute value of the adjusted-ROA in year 0 (1.9%). This ﬁgure is also
26 In an event study of operating performance, Barber and Lyon (1996) ﬁnd that a test statistic is consistent andwell speciﬁed onlywhen sample ﬁrms arematched to
appropriate benchmarks to control for abnormal ﬁrm performance prior to the event. For instance, if an industry has experienced abnormal growth in CF during a cer-
tain time period, it is highly likely that the sampleﬁrms in this industry experience a similar growth inCF. Assuming that aﬁrm in this industry engages in an acquisition
during the period, if we calculate the change of the ﬁrm's real performance due to the merger event without an appropriate benchmark (e.g. an industry benchmark),
this ﬁrm would appear to have an inﬂated change of operating performance.
27 Following Fama and French (1993), in each year, we partition ﬁrms into 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interacted with the cash ratio to control for
abnormal ﬁrm characteristics prior to the event.
28 The performance of mixed-payment acquisitions falls between the performance of cash and stock acquisitions: Mixed-payment bidders generally experience a de-
crease in performance before they take over other ﬁrms (i.e. from year−2 to year−1). This is then followed by an improvement in the post-acquisition period from
year 0 to year +2.
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economically signiﬁcant. This suggests that stock acquisitions may improve bidders' operating performance. Better operating perfor-
mance for stock acquisitions is in line with our previous ﬁnding of higher announcement returns.
Put together, ourﬁndings conﬁrm the underperformance of cash deals comparedwith stock deals in terms of abnormal announce-
ment returns documented in the previous section.29
29 The under-performance of cash acquisitions contradicts the asymmetric information explanation proposed by most US and UK studies. According to this explana-
tion, stock payments are preferred by overvalued bidders when purchasing target ﬁrms characterized by relative undervaluation. Furthermore, stock payments are
widely interpreted as a negative signal as they shift part of the (possibly negative) future returns to the new shareholders. By contrast, when bidders have favorable
private information about the high value of the target (potential synergies), they use cash to preempt potential competing bidders. Cash payments signal therefore pos-
itive information. Hence, on average, stock-ﬁnancedmergers underperform cash-ﬁnanced ones (Travlos, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Loughran and Anand, 1997; Andrade et
al., 2001; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Abhyankar et al., 2005).
Table 9
Changes in industry-adjusted operating performance.
Panel A: (industry-adjusted ROA, control group of ﬁrms based on industry)
Adjusted-ROA Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.025 −0.012 503 −0.028 −0.016 198 0.002 0.001 3092 −0.003 −0.001 3793
Year (-1) −0.022 −0.012 500 −0.034 −0.014 201 0.002 0.001 3217 −0.003 −0.001 3918
Year (0) −0.019 −0.008 508 −0.026 −0.011 203 0.001 0 3280 −0.003 −0.001 3991
Year (1) −0.011 −0.003 391 −0.017 −0.007 187 −0.002 −0.001 2968 −0.004 −0.002 3546
Year (2) 0.005 −0.001 306 −0.009 −0.003 176 −0.005 −0.003 2687 −0.004 −0.003 3169
D(-1/2) 0.027 0.011 0.025 0.011 −0.007 −0.004 −0.001 −0.002
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05** 0.00***
Panel B: (industry-adjusted CF, control group of ﬁrms based on industry)
Adjusted-CF Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.024 −0.013 500 −0.027 −0.02 197 0.002 0.002 3076 −0.003 −0.001 3773
Year (-1) −0.021 −0.012 496 −0.033 −0.012 200 0.002 0.002 3201 −0.002 0 3897
Year (0) −0.018 −0.01 506 −0.024 −0.011 203 0.001 0 3268 −0.003 −0.001 3977
Year(1) −0.011 −0.003 389 −0.018 −0.011 185 −0.002 0 2962 −0.004 −0.001 3536
Year (2) 0.005 0.002 305 −0.011 −0.006 173 −0.004 −0.001 2679 −0.004 −0.001 3157
D(-1/2) 0.026 0.014 0.022 0.006 −0.006 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03** 0.00***
Panel C: (performance-adjusted ROA, control group of ﬁrms based on size and cash levels)
Adjusted-ROA Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.02 −0.008 503 −0.02 −0.009 198 0.003 0.002 3090 −0.001 0 3791
Year (-1) −0.018 −0.009 500 −0.028 −0.01 201 0.003 0.001 3217 −0.001 0 3918
Year (0) −0.015 −0.006 508 −0.019 −0.007 203 0.002 0 3280 −0.001 −0.001 3991
Year (1) −0.007 −0.001 391 −0.012 −0.003 187 −0.001 0 2968 −0.002 −0.001 3546
Year (2) 0.01 0.004 306 −0.005 −0.004 176 −0.003 0 2687 −0.002 0 3169
D(-1/2) 0.019 0.013 0.023 0.006 −0.006 −0.001 −0.001 0
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.09* 0.04**
Panel D: (performance-adjusted CF, control group of ﬁrms based on size and cash levels)
Adjusted-CF Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Year mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs. Mean median No. obs. mean median No. obs.
Year (-2) −0.019 −0.01 500 −0.019 −0.013 197 0.004 0.001 3074 0 0 3771
Year (-1) −0.017 −0.01 496 −0.027 −0.01 200 0.004 0.001 3201 −0.001 0 3897
Year (0) −0.014 −0.009 506 −0.018 −0.007 203 0.002 0 3268 −0.001 −0.001 3977
Year (1) −0.007 −0.001 389 −0.012 −0.005 185 −0.001 −0.001 2962 −0.002 −0.001 3536
Year (2) 0.01 0.009 305 −0.008 −0.005 173 −0.003 −0.001 2679 −0.002 −0.001 3157
D(-1/2) 0.018 0.010 0.019 0.005 −0.007 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
t-test/signed-rank 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00***
Notes: this table presents annual mean and median values of adjusted return on assets (adjusted-ROA) in Panels A and C, and adjusted cash ﬂow (adjusted-CF) in Panels B
and D, from year−2 to year +2 relative to the year of acquisition. In Panels A and B, adjusted operating performance (industry-adjusted ROA or CF) is measured by the
difference between a ﬁrm's ROA (CF) and that of themedian ﬁrm in the industry in which that ﬁrm operates, in a given year. In Panels C and D, adjusted operating perfor-
mance (performance-adjusted ROA or CF) is constructed by subtracting the benchmark performance (the median performance of the ﬁrms in the same portfolio) from the
ﬁrm's operating performance in each year,where the benchmark performance is constructed as 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interactedwith the cash ratio
(Fama and French, 1993). D (−1/2) is the change of adjusted operating performance fromyear−1 to year+2.Weprovide the t-test and theWilcoxon signed-rank test for
differences in means and medians of adjusted operating performance from year−1 to year +2. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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4.4.2.2. Towhat extent does bidders' industry-adjusted operating performance change from the pre- to the post-merger period?. To conﬁrm
our previousﬁnding of a performance drop after a cash acquisition, in Table 10,we followHarford (1999) and present estimates of OLS
regressions aimed at seeingwhether there is a change in operating performance of acquiring ﬁrms aftermergers for deals ﬁnanced in
different ways. Our baseline regression model is as follows:
Post−merger Adj:ROA CFð Þ ¼ b0 þ b1Pre−merger Adj:ROA CFð Þ þ ei ð4Þ
The dependent variable is the post-merger adjusted operating performance of the bidder in year +1 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), or
from year +1 to year +2 (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). Independent variables are the pre-merger operating performance of the bidder in
year −1 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), or from year −2 to year −1 (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). As in the previous section, we measure
operating performance using industry-adjusted return on assets (industry-adjusted ROA) and industry-adjusted cash ﬂow (industry-
adjusted CF). The results are reported respectively in Panels A and B of Table 10. We then use performance-adjusted return on
assets (performance-adjusted ROA) and performance-adjusted cash ﬂow (performance-adjusted CF), and report the results
respectively in Panels C and D. The coefﬁcient b1 captures the continuation of pre-merger operating performance for bidding ﬁrms.
Table 10
Regressions of industry-adjusted operating performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stock Only Mixed PYMT Cash Only All Bidders
Panel A: (industry-adjusted ROA, control group of ﬁrms based on industry)
ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y
Intercept −0.006 0.009 −0.007 −0.002 −0.004*** −0.010*** −0.004*** −0.007***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_ROA 0.238*** 0.258*** 0.326*** 0.417*** 0.382*** 0.450*** 0.349*** 0.396***
(0.091) (0.093) (0.102) (0.083) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029)
No. obs. 383 295 185 171 2901 2497 3469 2963
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.15
F-value 6.93 7.67 10.26 24.98 113.44 194.70 124.99 192.83
Panel B: (industry-adjusted CF, control group of ﬁrms based on industry)
CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y
Intercept −0.007 0.008 −0.008 −0.005 −0.003*** −0.010*** −0.004*** −0.007***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_CF 0.240*** 0.275*** 0.325*** 0.423*** 0.409*** 0.487*** 0.371*** 0.430***
(0.091) (0.093) (0.103) (0.088) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
No. obs. 377 287 182 167 2881 2463 3440 2917
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.18
F-value 6.95 8.83 9.93 23.17 131.88 247.00 144.33 239.00
Panel C: (performance-adjusted ROA control group of ﬁrms based on size and cash level)
ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_1Y ROA_2Y
Intercept −0.004 0.014** −0.004 −0.000 −0.002** −0.007*** −0.002** −0.004**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_ROA 0.215** 0.238*** 0.301*** 0.376*** 0.352*** 0.422*** 0.322*** 0.373***
(0.086) (0.091) (0.091) (0.088) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
No. obs. 383 295 185 171 2901 2495 3469 2961
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.13
F-value 6.18 6.82 10.97 18.21 107.88 185.90 119.13 182.21
Panel D: (performance-adjusted CF, control group of ﬁrms based on size and cash level)
CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y CF_1Y CF_2Y
Intercept −0.005 0.013* −0.004 −0.003 −0.002** −0.008*** −0.002** −0.005***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-merger_CF 0.220** 0.246*** 0.297*** 0.383*** 0.388*** 0.461*** 0.351*** 0.409***
(0.085) (0.090) (0.093) (0.094) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)
No. obs. 377 287 182 167 2881 2461 3440 2915
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.16
F-value 6.65 7.41 10.16 16.70 138.28 248.45 150.38 237.95
Notes: this table presents the results of an OLS regression of the effect of the pre-merger adjusted operating performance on post-merger adjusted operating per-
formance. The dependent variable is the post-merger adjusted operating performance of the bidder in year +1 (ROA_1Y / CF_1Y) or from year +1 to year +2
(ROA_2Y / CF_2Y). Pre-merger performance is the adjusted operating performance of the bidder in year −1 (or from year −2 to year −1). In Panels A and B, ad-
justed operating performance (industry-adjusted ROA or CF) is measured by the difference between a ﬁrm's ROA (CF) and that of the median ﬁrm in the industry
in which that ﬁrm operates in a given year. In Panels C and D, adjusted operating performance (performance-adjusted ROA or CF) is constructed by subtracting
the benchmark performance (the median performance of the ﬁrms in the same portfolio) from the ﬁrm's operating performance in each year, where the
benchmark performance is constructed as 25 portfolios on the basis of size (total assets) interacted with the cash ratio (Fama and French, 1993). The t-statistics
(in parentheses) are based on standard errors, which are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. F-value represents the F-test of overall signiﬁcance. *, **, ***
indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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The coefﬁcient of interest is b0, which captures any change in abnormal operating performance from the pre- to the post-merger
period.
Focusing on all bidders, the results in columns 7 and 8 of Table 10 show that the b0 coefﬁcients in the regressions of both adjusted-
ROA (Panel A) and adjusted-CF (Panel B), which measure the change in abnormal operating performance from the pre- to the post-
merger period, are signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level. Speciﬁcally, focusing on column 8, we observe a b0 coefﬁcient of−0.7% in
both panels, suggesting that on average, there is a signiﬁcant drop in abnormal operatingperformance from the pre- to the post-merg-
er period. Furthermore, when the regression is performed separately based on themethods of payment (columns 1 to 6), we observe
that the coefﬁcients b0 are positive for stock-ﬁnanced deals when post-merger adjusted operating performance is measured in a 2-
years window, but still signiﬁcantly negative for the cash deals regardless of how operating performance is measured.
Theseﬁndings suggest that cash bidders tend to underperform in termsof operatingperformance from the pre- to thepost-merger
period. This is consistent with the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis, according to which bidders who use cash as a method
of payment face a lower opportunity cost of holding cash, and are likely to spend their cash on value-decreasing deals.
Overall, the tests in this section support Hypothesis III, according to which cash acquirers perform signiﬁcantly worse than stock
acquirers both in terms of announcement returns and long-run operatingperformance. They also tell a consistent story thatﬁrmswith
more ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and lower investment opportunities are more likely to use cash payments for the acquisition and subse-
quently exhibit worse performance.
5. Conclusions
We investigate M&As in China during the period 1998–2015, focusing on the role of corporate liquidity. We develop a set of hy-
potheses to empirically test the links between ﬁrms' ﬁnancial conditions and their acquisition behavior, as well as their performance
following mergers. First, consistent with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), we ﬁnd that cash-rich ﬁrms are more likely to
attempt acquisitions than their cash-poor counterparts. Acquisitions can therefore be seen as a way bywhich ﬁrms spend excess cash
instead of paying it out to shareholders. Further, we observe that high-Qﬁrmswith greater operating performance (ROA) are less like-
ly to attempt acquisitions, implying that good-operating ﬁrms with higher growth opportunities do not rely on external investment
like M&As to spend their excess cash.
Second, we ﬁnd that greater excess cash reserves lead ﬁrms that are subject to tunneling to engage in takeover activities. This sug-
gests that Chinese ﬁrms are likely to useM&As as a channel to expropriate cash through tunneling. In other words, tunneling is likely
to amplify free cash ﬂow-driven takeovers.
Third, after controlling for all other determinants of themethod of payment, we ﬁnd that bidders with greater growth opportuni-
ties, reﬂected by higher stock valuation (Tobin'sQ), are less likely to use cash as amethod of payment. This effect is stronger for ﬁnan-
cially constrained ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is in linewith the opportunity cost of holding cash hypothesis (Alshwer et al., 2011), according to
which cash comes at a cost for constrained bidders, especially those with valuable growth opportunities. Hence, the higher their
growth opportunities, the more reluctant are these bidders to use cash to ﬁnance acquisitions.
Finally, we observe that the low opportunity costs of cash holdings drive Chinese acquiring ﬁrms to make value-destroying cash-
ﬁnanced acquisitions, which leads to under-performance. Speciﬁcally, cash acquisitions underperform stock acquisitions: Cash bid-
ders generate in fact worse announcement abnormal returns compared with stock bidders. Under-performance of cash acquisition
also comes along with a signiﬁcant post-merger drop in bidders' operating performance.
Our study is in linewith the free cash ﬂowmotive of acquisitions, wherebymanagers tend to waste excess cash reserves on value-
losing cash acquisitions. This effect is found to be particularly large for thoseﬁrms subject to tunneling. Hence, we believe that tunnel-
ing can be a motivation behind acquisition activities in China, a country where the quality of corporate governance is weak (Allen et
al., 2005). Given the relatively high ﬁnancial capacity which characterizes some Chinese ﬁrms due to their high growth rates and abil-
ity to generate large amounts of internal funds (Guariglia et al., 2011), it is essential for these cash-rich ﬁrms never to rush into acqui-
sitions (particularly cash acquisitions), but rather to ﬁnd more efﬁcient and sensible ways to use their liquid assets to pursue
expansion opportunities.
Ongoing reforms should reduce the agency costs associated with acquisitions, improve corporate transparency in M&A transac-
tions, and protect the interests of minority shareholders by increasing the intensity of monitoring by other blockholders or indepen-
dent institutions, aligning the interests between managers and investors, and disclosing connected transactions (e.g. tunneling).
Finally, given that cash is an important resource for ﬁrms operating in imperfect capital markets, a cautious approach on how to
use it more efﬁciently should be promoted. A thorough evaluation of investment projects, as well as a sophisticated regulation and
supervision of corporate proﬁt distribution, and a more market-oriented allocation of resources would therefore beneﬁt the Chinese
economy.
Appendix 1. A case study about tunneling occurring through M&As
China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd. (stock code: 600900.SH) is the largest listed hydropower company in China, with main operations
spanning hydropower generation and the sale of electricity. Yangtze Power is a state-owned enterprise.More than 60% of its shares in
2011 were held by its parent ﬁrm, the China Three Gorges Corporation.
On August 31st 2011, Yangtze Power announced the signing of an agreement with Three Gorges on the acquisition of the Under-
ground Power Station (6 units with a capacity of 700 MW each). The takeover proceeded in two batches. On September 30th 2011,
the company accomplished the takeover of the ﬁrst batch of assets of the Underground Power Station, and on September 18th
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2012, the company ﬁnished the takeover of the remaining assets, with a total payment of 11.368 billion yuan (7.636 billion and 3.732
billion RMB for the ﬁrst and second purchase, respectively).
The book value of the assets of the Underground Power Station was only 7.147 billion RMB, i.e. around 62.9% of its purchasing
price.30 Moreover, based on data published by the National Audit Ofﬁce on September 10th 2015, all six units of Underground
Power Station had generated 4.255 billion kilowatt-hours of energy per year from its full operation in 2012 to 2014. This corresponds
to a net proﬁt of 218million in total over the period, or to an average proﬁt of 72.7 million per year, and even though production over
those years was 21% in excess of the company's annual design generation capacity,31 it contributed only to 0.114% of earnings per
share.
In summary, due to the high purchase price (high premium) and relatively low proﬁt generated by the acquired company, it is dif-
ﬁcult to see how this acquisition could enhance the value of Yangtze Power. In other words, this related party deal was likely to be
detrimental to minority shareholders, as it transferred beneﬁts to the controlling shareholder (Three Gorges) through the high pre-
mium paid. For this reason, the acquisition of the Underground Power Station can be seen as an example of tunneling taking place
through M&As.
Appendix 2. Deﬁnitions of the variables used
Table A1 provides deﬁnitions of the variables used in the paper.
Table A1: Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Blockholders Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder.
CAR3, CAR5:
cumulative abnormal returns
CAR3 and CAR5 are the cumulative abnormal returns in the 3-day (−1, +1) and 5-day (−2, +2) event windows,
respectively, where 0 corresponds to the announcement. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the market
model with parameters estimated over the period beginning 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the deal announcement
for different day event windows around the announcement (day 0).
Cash Ratio of the sum of cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
Cash ﬂow Ratio of the sum of net proﬁt and depreciation to total assets
Completed Dummy variable equal to one if the transaction was completed, and zero otherwise.
Competing Dummy variable equal to one if a third party launched an offer for the target while the original bid was pending, and zero
otherwise.
DIF_Blockholders Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm's blockholder's controlling ownership exceeds its cash ﬂow ownership in a given
year, and zero otherwise.
DivDum Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm pays dividends, and zero otherwise.
Diversifying Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder is not in the same industry as the target (measured using the bidder's and the
target's ﬁrst two digits of primary SIC code), and zero otherwise.
Employees Number of employees.
Experienced Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder has announced at least 3 takeover bids over the ﬁve-year period prior to the deal
announcement, and 0 otherwise.
Financial Acquirer Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder is buying a non-ﬁnancial target company for ﬁnancial reasons rather than for
strategic reasons, and zero otherwise.
Financial Sponsor Dummy variable equal to one if the deal has any buyout or ﬁnancial sponsor involvement on either the buying side or the
selling side, and zero otherwise.
KZ index Following Lamont et al. (2001), the Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index is a linear function of ﬁve variables. Speciﬁcally:
KZt = −1.002 ∗ CFt / Kt − 1 + 0.283 ∗ Qt + 3.139 ∗ Debtt / TKt − 39.368 ∗ (DIVt / Kt − 1) − 1.315 ∗ Casht / Kt − 1
where t indexes time; CFt is cash ﬂow (net income + depreciation); Qt is Tobin's Q; Debtt is the sum of short- and long-term
debt; DIVt is dividends; Casht is cash and cash equivalents; Kt is capital; TKt is total capital (sum of debt and equity). A ﬁrm
with a higher value of the KZ index can be intended to be more ﬁnancially constrained.
Leverage Ratio of the sum of short- and long-term debt to total assets.
Market value of assets Sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book value of non-tradable stocks, and market value of net debt.
Method of payment:
Cash Only, Mixed PYMT,
Payment_cash, Stock Only
Cash Only: dummy variable equal to one if the payment is pure cash, and zero otherwise.Mixed PYMT: dummy variable equal
to one if the payment is neither all-cash nor all-stock, and zero otherwise. Payment_cash: dummy variable equal to one if the
payment is mainly cash (N50%), and zero otherwise. Stock Only: dummy variable equal to one if the payment is pure stock,
and zero otherwise.
NWC Ratio of net working capital (working capital minus cash holdings) to total assets.
OREC Ratio of other receivables to total assets.
Payout Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm pays dividends in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Public_deals Dummy variable equal to one if the target is a listed ﬁrm, and zero otherwise.
PE (price-to-earnings ratio) Ratio of market value per share to earnings per share.
Return Annual stock returns
Runup_stock Cumulative daily stock price returns of the bidder over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the
announcement date.
Runup_market Cumulative daily Shanghai and Shenzhen value-weighted stock returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending
30 The real value of the assets of theUnderground Power Station is likely to be over-estimated. On September 30th 2011, theNational Audit Ofﬁce raised several issues
highlighted on the audit report of the ﬁnal accounts at the completion of the underground power station project. 337.9 million RMB remained unaccounted for and a
large amount of construction contract projects (1.54 billion RMB) was involved in hidden accounting and corruption problems.
31 The annual design generation capacity refers to themaximumelectric output power stations can produce under speciﬁc conditions. The excess generation of 21% of
the annual capacity may be due to the high runoff in the Yangtze River.
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(continued)
Variable Deﬁnition
6 days prior to the deal announcement.
Return on assets (ROA) Ratio of net income to total assets.
Rumors Dummy variable equal to one if the transaction is currently (or originally began as) a rumor, and zero otherwise.
Sigma_stock Standard deviation of the bidding ﬁrm's daily returns over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the
announcement date.
Sales growth Rate of growth of real sales.
Size Natural logarithm of total assets.
Size_ratio Ratio of transaction value divided by the bidder's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement
Shareholding_CEO Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm's top executives (including the CEO) are holding shares in their own company, and
zero otherwise.
SOEs Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm is state owned in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Tobin Tobin's Q: sum of the market value of tradable stocks, the book value of non-tradable stocks, and the market value of net
debt, divided by the book value of total assets.
Unfriendly Dummy variable equal to one if the deal is not deﬁned as friendly by Thomson Financial SDC, and zero otherwise.
Var_CF Mean of the standard deviations of cash ﬂow over total assets of ﬁrms in the same industry.
WW index Derived from Whited and Wu (2006), theWW index is a linear function based on six ﬁnancial variables. Speciﬁcally:
WWt = −0.091 ∗ CFt / BAt − 1 − 0.062 ∗ Payoutt + 0.021 ∗ TLTDt / CAt − 1 − 0.044 ∗ LNBAt − 0.035 ∗ SGRt + 0.102 ∗ ISGt
where t indexes time; CFt is cash ﬂow (net income + depreciation); BAt is book assets; Payoutt is a dummy indicating
positive dividends; TLTDt is long-term debt; CAt is total current assets; Qt is Tobin's Q; LNBAt is the natural log of the book
value of assets; SGRt is ﬁrm real sales growth; ISGt is industry sales growth. A ﬁrm with a higher value of theWW index can
be intended to be more ﬁnancially constrained.
Notes: all variables (with the exception of dummy variables) are deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator, which is obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Appendix 3. Measure of excess cash
Excess cash (Xcash) is used to assess whether there is a relationship between cash-richness and acquisition decisions. Following
Opler et al. (1999), excess cash is computed by subtracting the optimal level of cash holdings from the actual value of cash and
cash equivalents (Cash). Speciﬁcally, in the OPSWmodel, cash holdings are assumed to be a function of Tobin's Q (deﬁned as the ﬁrm's
market-to-book ratio); Firm size (deﬁned as the natural logarithmof the ﬁrm's total assets); Cash ﬂow (deﬁned as the ratio of the sum
of net proﬁt and depreciation to total assets); NWC (deﬁned as the ratio of net working capital to total assets); CAPEX (deﬁned as the
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets); Leverage (deﬁned as the ratio of short- and long-term debt to total assets);DivDum (a div-
idend payout dummy set to one if theﬁrmpays dividends, and 0 otherwise);Var_CF (themean of the standard deviations of cashﬂow
over total assets of ﬁrms in the same industry). As ownership is likely to be important in the Chinese context, we also control for state
ownership, by including a dummy variable (SOEs) that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is state owned in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely to face ﬁnancial constraints. Therefore, according to the precautionary motive, one
should expect SOEs to hold less cash than their non state-owned counterparts.
For ﬁrm i in year t and industry j, the model of cash holdings is therefore given by the following equation:
Cashi;t ¼ aþ∑kbkXk;i;t ¼ aþ b1Qi;t þ b2Sizei;t þ b3CFi;t þ b4NWCi;t þ b5CAPEXi;t
þb6Leveragei;t þ b7DivDumi;t þ b8VarCF j;t þ b9SOEsi;t þ vi þ vt þ vp þ εi;t
ð5Þ
Xk,i,t is the vector of k explanatory variables that affect the costs and beneﬁts of cash holdings. Eq. (5) also incorporates time and
provincial dummies, which account for year (vt) and regional (vp) ﬁxed-effects associated with ﬁrms' cash holdings.
The regression is estimated using the ﬁxed-effects estimator, which accounts for unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity (vi).32 It
should be noted that because of collinearity, industry dummies cannot be included in the equations when the ﬁxed-effects estimator
is used. Theﬁtted values of Eq. (5) can be interpreted as a proxy for the optimal level of cashholdings.Wemeasure excess cash (Xcash)
as the difference between the actual values of cash holdings and the ﬁtted values derived from Eq. (5).
Appendix 4. Predicting the probability of being a bidder
In addition to the role played by excess cash holdings described in Section 4.1, the results in column 1 of Table 3 also show that the
marginal effects associated with Return, Tobin, ROA and Size, have positive and signiﬁcant signs, which suggests that larger ﬁrmswith
higher stock market returns (Return), higher investment opportunities (Tobin), and better operating performance (ROA) are more
likely to make acquisitions. These ﬁndings are in line with Roll (1986) and Harford (1999), and support the hubris theory, according
to which takeover deals can be promoted by ﬁrms' better performance and returns. Speciﬁcally, due to acquirer managers' hubris, ex-
cessive arrogance, andmyopia, a higher ﬁrm proﬁtability may leadmanagers with discretion to make self-interested and entrenched
decisions on acquisitions, in order to diversify their personal portfolios and increase the scale and scope of operating assets in their
hands (Moeller et al., 2004).
32 The results are not reported for brevity but available upon request. We also estimated Eq. (5) separately in each year of the sample period, in order to allow the
determinants of cash holdings to vary from year to year. The results remained substantially unchanged.
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As for the ownership structure variables, our results provide evidence that Shareholding_CEO and Blockholders have a negative im-
pact on the probability of being a bidder. This can be explained as follows. First, when the ﬁrm's CEO holds shares in his/her own com-
pany (Shareholding_CEO), thismay reduce the agency costs faced by the ﬁrm sincemanagerial ownershipmay help to alignmanagers'
interests with those of the ﬁrm's shareholders.33 Thus, managers who hold shares in their own company may be less likely to make
acquisitions due to personal interests. Second, a large ownership stake held by the blockholder (Blockholders) tends to lower the sep-
aration of voting rights and cash ﬂow rights, whichmay lower the tendency of managers to engage in takeovers for tunneling reasons
(Jiang et al., 2010). Moreover, a relatively large stake may give the primary owners a higher incentive to oversee or monitor theman-
agers, alleviating therefore agency costs stemming from a conﬂict of interest between ﬁrm managers and shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Ang et al., 2000). Alternatively, controlling owners with a relatively large stake might be reluctant to lose the control
of their ﬁrms by engaging in acquisitions. Therefore, ﬁrms characterized by a high ownership stake of controlling shareholdersmay be
more cautious in making investments through M&As (Amihud et al., 1990).
Appendix 5. Other determinants of the method of payment
Focusing on variables other than Tobin's Q and its interaction with the ﬁnancing constraints dummies in Eq. (2), we observe that
the marginal effect associated with the bidder's cash ﬂow (CF) is positive and signiﬁcant in all columns of Table 5. This is consistent
with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), according to which higher amounts of cash ﬂow may increase the likelihood of
cash payments in acquisitions. Next, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant and positive signs on the marginal effects associated with the variable
(Shareholding_CEO) and our indicator of ﬁnancial bidder (Financial Acquirer), suggesting that when the acquiring company's CEO
holds shares in his/her own company or when the bidder is buying a non-ﬁnancial target company for ﬁnancial rather than for stra-
tegic reasons, cash payments are preferred. A possible explanation for the former is that the acquiring ﬁrm tends to spend cash to re-
lieve the agency problems of free cash ﬂow associated with CEO shareholding (Harford, 1999). Alternatively, it is possible that CEOs
holding shares in their own company are unwilling to dilute their stake in the bidding ﬁrm. A possible explanation for the positive
marginal effects associated with the Financial Acquirer variable is that the acquiring ﬁrmwhich engages in M&As for ﬁnancial reasons
is either a buyout ﬁrm, a merchant bank, a commercial bank or an investment bank. As such, they might hold more cash, which en-
ables them, in turn, to produce the funds necessary to make a cash deal.
We also ﬁnd that the probability of choosing cash payments is positively related to the dummy variable (Experienced), which im-
plies that those bidders who have conducted multiple takeover deals prefer to use cash, probably due to the higher liquidity at their
disposal.34
Turning to the deal's characteristics, consistent with Faccio and Lang (2002), Harford et al. (2009) and Karampatsas et al. (2014),
we observe that the variable regarding the targets' listing status (Public_deals) has negative and signiﬁcantmarginal effects in all spec-
iﬁcations, suggesting that in deals where unlisted targets are involved, a greater use of cash is made, while stock payments are more
attractive for bidders of listed targets. This can be explained considering that private sellers should be more likely to accept cash as a
method of payment due to their consumption and liquidity needs. In addition, stock acquisitions of unlisted targets with a concentrat-
ed ownership structure would dilute the dominant shareholders' stake in bidding ﬁrms, and potentially create a large rival
blockholder, which could represent a corporate control threat for the bidder (Amihud et al., 1990).
The attitude indicator for the deals deﬁned as unfriendly (Unfriendly) has a negative and signiﬁcant marginal effect in all regres-
sion. This result is consistent with unfriendly bidder preference for cash ﬁnancing to close the deal quickly, thus deterring other com-
peting bidders and aggressive defenses against hostile takeovers (Linn and Switzer, 2001; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Alshwer et al.,
2011). Fishman (1989) documents that unlike the value of stock payments, which is contingent upon the proﬁtability of the acquisi-
tion, a cash offer facilitates amore rapid deal completion. By contrast, stock paymentswill lower the speed of the takeover process due
to security registration and the requirements of approval by the bidder's shareholders. Furthermore, using stock lowers the likelihood
of acceptance since a stock offer is presumed to have a low value (Gilson and Black, 1986; Fishman, 1989).
Next, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant and negative signs on the marginal effects associated with the indicators of deal completion (Completed)
and of competing bids (Competing), suggesting that completed acquisitions and the oneswhich involve competing bidders tend to use
non-cash payments. A possible explanationmay be that non-cashmergers are more likely to be associatedwith administrative trans-
fers or connected transactions between one government agency and another. Under the command of the government, these non-cash
deals may attract more bidders in M&A negotiations and are more likely to be completed.
We also ﬁnd a negative marginal effect associated with the Financial Sponsor variable, which suggests that bidders with ﬁnancial
sponsor involvement (which include private equity- as well as venture capital-backed deals) prefer to use stocks as a method of pay-
ment. This can be explained in the light of the fact that private equity-owned companies have substantially high debt levels and there-
fore limited capacity to raise cashﬁnancing externally (Leslie andOyer, 2008). Hence, they prefer to use stock as amethod of payment.
33 Alternatively, it may be the case that managers decide to foregoM&As, as ﬁnancing them bymeans of a stock swapwould dilute their stake in the company by too
large an extent.
34 Due to hubris or entrenchment, multiple acquisitions may be used by management to spend excess liquidity, destroying ﬁrms' value (Billett and Qian, 2008; Black
et al., 2015). The negative announcement effect for bidders who have conducted multiple takeover deals (shown in Section 4.4.1.2 and discussed in Appendix 6) con-
ﬁrms the hubris conjecture.
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Appendix 6. Other determinants of bidders' CARs
Focusing on variables other than Payment_Cash, Tobin's Q, and their interaction in Eq. (3), Table 8ﬁrst shows a signiﬁcantly positive
coefﬁcient on the bidder's cash ﬂow (CF), which suggests that the market reacts more positively to mergers with high cash ﬂow
bidders.
Second, the coefﬁcients on the dummy variables SOEs and Experienced are generally signiﬁcantly negative, which suggests that
state-owned acquiring ﬁrms and ﬁrms that make many acquisitions are more likely to undertake low-beneﬁt M&A deals. The former
can be explained considering that even though acquiring ﬁrms from the state sector might enjoy favorable ﬁnancial and political sup-
port due to government intervention (Zhou et al., 2015), non-economic motivations (e.g. tunneling) may lead to misallocation of
ﬁrms' resources. Consistent with Billett and Qian (2008) and Black et al. (2015), the latter can be explained by the fact that hubris
and over-conﬁdence developed from past acquisitions may lead to value-losing deals.
Third, the announcement returns increasewith the higher relative size of the deal. This is consistentwith ﬁndings reported for Chi-
nese listed ﬁrms by Zhou et al. (2015) and Black et al. (2015), and for USﬁrms by Asquith et al. (1983) andMoeller et al. (2004). It may
be explained considering that the larger the size of the deal, the more signiﬁcant the addition to the bidder's value (Asquith et al.,
1983). Yet, the coefﬁcients associated with Size_ratio are virtually 0.
Fourth, we ﬁnd that the gain to acquirers is positively associated with diversifying deals (Diversifying). This is in line with recent
research according to which diversiﬁcation may be related to higher ﬁrm value (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004), as
ﬁrms may choose to diversify to move away from industries with relatively low growth prospects.
Fifth, both the indicators of rumored deals (Rumors) and of ﬁnancial bidder (Financial Acquirer) are negatively and signiﬁcantly as-
sociated with abnormal returns.35 The former is in line with recent ﬁndings according to which rumors may signiﬁcantly impact
merger outcomes and post-acquisition performance, among other things (Alperovych et al., 2016; Cumming et al., 2016). Given
the fact that rumors can destroy the deal value (Alperovych et al., 2016), markets respond negatively to a takeover rumor. The latter
suggests that ﬁnancially motivated M&As might achieve fewer synergies than strategically motivated ones.
Sixth, the indicators of deal completion (Completed) and of competing bids (Competing) are positively and signiﬁcantly associated
with the bidder's returns.36 The former suggests that failure to complete carries costs.37 The latter might be due to the fact that the
occurrence of competing bids conveys positive information and thus leads to positive abnormal announcement returns.
Seventh, we ﬁnd that the Financial Sponsor dummy is positively related with bidders' announcement CARs. This can be explained
considering that experienced ﬁnancial sponsors are able to identify and structure deals so as to achieve greater synergies.
Lastly, in line with Rosen (2006) and Golubov et al. (2012), the stock price run-up of acquiring ﬁrms (Runup_stock) is negatively
associatedwith abnormal returns. This may be due to hubris: Recent success may lead to incorrect business decisionmaking, asman-
agers affected by hubris may think they have better information about the target value than themarket, and believe that the deal can
create value in the long run. Therefore, these managers may tend to offer excessively high premiums for the targets. The market may
perceive this situation, which may cause a reverse reaction to the pre-merger performance.
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